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Introduction 
 This project began as most good investigations do, with a burning personal question: 
What nourishes the souls of people in our time?  One notes in modern American culture a 
shortened attention span; the inability to remain still, quiet, solitary.  In 1965 around 55% of 
American Catholics attended Mass on Sundays; in 2016 that number stood at 22%.1  Some 30.1 
million American adults consider themselves “ex-Catholics,” a number which should cause 
concern for leaders within the Catholic Church.  At the same time people feel adrift and 
uncertain of the future; cultural divisions rankle people of good will; social media has replaced 
face-to-face communication; politics has grown course and caustic. 
 So what, in our day and age, can nourish the hungry, disquieted soul?  What can address 
both the shortened attention span and the sense of drift from institutional faith commitments?   
 This project hazards an answer to these questions.  A lazy historiography would claim the 
present moment as the most challenging and complicated age in history.  We need not overstate 
the challenges of the present moment, but we do well to survey the lay of the land.  To that end, 
we will begin with a survey of what Charles Taylor calls the “modern cosmic imaginary” — how 
individuals conceive of their lives vis-a-vis God, institutional faith, transcendence, etc.  We will 
consider how we have arrived here by considering movements in European thought, with 
particular focus on how they have played out in literature.  It will be argued that the aesthetic 
sensibilities of 19th century, and personalist turn in philosophy and theology, have led us to 
something of an impasse – an impasse requiring an imaginative step to traverse. 
 What role, if any, can literature play in mediating the individual, faith, and secular 
culture?  In a modern world that offers many differing accounts of spiritual “fullness,” what role 
does the Christian imagination have? Dominican priest Marie-Dominique Chenu was 
                                                            
1 2016 Cara Survey, available at http://cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-church-statistics/ 
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instrumental in drafting the documents that would become Vatican II’s “Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World” (Gaudium et Spes).  This foundational document addressed 
how the Church was to navigate the sacred and secular in the latter half of the 20th century.  And 
in the explosion of theology after the Council (1962-65), Chenu wrote a 1969 article titled “La 
littérature comme ‘lieu’ de la théologie” (“Literature as the Site of Theology”).  In it he argued 
first that Catholicism needs to recover its roots in Scripture, which for most of the Church’s early 
history had nourished Catholic thought.  Secondly, he hoped that the reconnection with Scripture 
would put Catholicism back in touch with human culture.  Romantic poets and writers, he 
maintained, held Christian Scripture as a shared cultural canon for all of humanity; a contact 
point between believers and the broader secular culture.  Chenu believed that the Church had 
been ignoring secular culture for the previous centuries, to its detriment.   
Literature, then, is the lieu where sacred and secular meet.  Just as God is poured out in 
the kenosis of the Incarnation, so too the Bible pours images and concerns into human language, 
and the Bible is where God raises human language and images to a new dignity.  God is not 
revealed in a list of propositions, but in literary history, in a string of stories.  Nicholas Boyle, in 
his book Sacred and Secular Scriptures, argues that “one light illuminates all the fields that a 
university is called to study… [L]iterature appears to us as a halo around the light, fading off into 
shadow – as if [they are gathered] round the canonical books of sacred scripture.”2   
It will be argued that the Word became incarnate in the world to lead us back to God 
the Creator, and this exitus and reditus is given and received in human language.  In like 
manner, the words of great literature can direct our attention and reinvigorate the modern 
cosmic imaginary with a Christian imagination, instructing the reader to engage in a dive into 
the particulars of his or her concrete life.  In mining those details, s/he can attain insights.  
                                                            
Nicholas Boyle, Sacred and Secular Scriptures, 7. 
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We will call this trek of inquiry a via litteraria — connecting our lives with the life of God, by 
way of literature.  To that end we will focus on the work of the American Christian writer of 
fiction and essays, Marilynne Robinson, who is a prime example of this via litteraria.  
 
Road Map of the Via Litteraria 
 
 We begin our discussion with laying an important theological foundation.  In Chapter I: 
“Theological Grounds for the Via Litteraria,” we will consider how storytelling and literature 
interplay with Scripture.  From there we move to Augustine’s account of words and sacraments 
as concrete signs (signa) which point beyond themselves to an otherwise invisible reality (res).  
This will lead to a brief history of grace and nature in Christian thought, as a way to see the point 
of contact between concrete experience and insights into deeper reality, what Christians call 
union with God.  In the 20th-century turn to the subject, fiction becomes an ideal venue for 
discussing how grace is operative, because it draws on and nourishes the imagination. 
Chapter II “Literary and Theological Imaginations” will consider the faculty of the 
imagination — what it is, what it isn’t, and how it engages in creative poiesis.  From there we 
will seek to formulate a “theology of imagination,” drawing on insights from both 19th-century 
Scottish Presbyterian George MacDonald and 20th-century American Jesuit William Lynch.  
Rather than flying into abstractions and phantasy, the Christian imagination takes seriously the 
finite experiences of the human person.  We will see what distinguishes “light reading” from 
“heavy” literature, with the help of Wolfgang Iser’s literary theory. We will explore connections 
between the literary acts (writing/reading) and acts of faith, and see how both challenge the 
reader to (a) attention and (b) an empathic self-displacement for the sake of understanding an 
other. 
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Chapter III: “Marilynne Robinson and the Island of the Articulable” will take so much 
theology and theorizing and see if it applies to her work.  We begin that chapter with a further 
discussion of the Romantic period, the challenges of what Charles Taylor calls the “modern 
cosmic imaginary,” which is marked by cross-pressures and different interpretations of reality.  
Charles Taylor’s extensive treatment of western (un)belief, A Secular Age, suggest that the North 
Atlantic currently inhabits a secular world, understood in three ways: Secularized public places 
(“secularity 1”), a general decline in belief and practice (“secularity 2”), and “secularity 3”, 
which is important for our inquiry.  Secularity 3, Taylor explains, consists of new conditions for 
belief, wherein “Christian faith exists in a field where there is also a wide range of other spiritual 
options.  But the interesting story is not simply one of decline, but also…the occasion for 
recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of existing both in and out of 
relation to God.”3  For Taylor, Secularity 3 is the space within which both belief and unbelief are 
undertaken with full knowledge that there are other viable options for pursuing human 
flourishing.  This is a time when believers and buffered non-believers alike have “doubts about 
their doubts.”  Literature, I will argue, is a non-coercive, safe venue wherein people can suspend 
their (dis-)belief to entertain a different cosmic imaginary.   
 Taylor identifies several “itineraries” – ways of proceeding in secularity 3 – to move 
forward.  I submit for your consideration that Marilynne Robinson is one such itinerant, who 
highlights God’s grace embedded in every moment of creation, if we but stop and pay attention 
to it.  Robinson’s fiction and non-fiction writing deftly challenging believer and non-believer 
alike to consider the unthematized backdrop of their beliefs; and she offers what a way to faith 
might look like for the skeptic. 
                                                            
3 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, 437. 
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Chapter IV: “Questions and Conclusions” will entertain thoughtful critiques to this 
project, and offer not final answers, but some concluding thoughts on the Christian imagination 
in the modern cosmic imaginary. 
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Chapter I: Theological Prongs for the Via Litteraria 
 
Biblical Grounds for Literature  
 
Ἀλλὰ σὺ γ᾽ οὐ θνῇσκεις, ἕστηκας γὰρ ζοὸς αίεί, 
Ἐν γὰρ σοὶ ζῶµεν καὶ κινύµεθ᾽ ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσµέν. 
 
But you are not dead: you live and abide forever, 
For in you we live and move and have our being.  
- Epimenides of Knossos 
 
There is reliable biblical grounding for our theological inquiry through literature.  Jesus explains 
to his inquiring disciples in Matthews’ gospel why he speaks parabolically: 
Because knowledge of the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven has been granted 
to you, but to them it has not been granted.  …This is why I speak to them in 
parables, because ‘they look but do not see and hear but do not listen or 
understand.’  Isaiah’s prophecy is fulfilled in them, which says:  
‘You shall indeed hear but not understand, 
you shall indeed look but never see.4 
 
Insight only comes to those who are willing to probe the concrete details of Jesus’ parables, and 
visual/audial language grounds levels of (mis-)understanding:  One can look at parables’ 
metaphorical images without seeing their meaning, and hear the words without listening to their 
salvific importance.  Insights about ultimate reality are encoded in stories, but their meaning is 
not reserved only for scholars and professionals.  In keeping with Jewish fashion, God is 
responsible both for the understanding of the disciples and the incomprehension of the crowds.  
The reader of Jesus’ parables is encouraged, in no uncertain terms, to move from the willful 
incomprehension to the understanding of a disciple.  The inability to see and understand parables 
is not a neutral epistemic stance, but one that carries moral responsibility.  Jesus continues, 
Gross (ἐπαχύνθη) is the heart of this people, 
they will hardly hear with their ears,  
they have closed their eyes, 
lest they see with their eyes 
and hear with their ears 
and understand with their heart and be converted (καὶ ἐπιστρέψωσιν), 
and I will heal (καὶ ἰάσοµαι) them.’5 
                                                            
4Matthew 13:10ff.  All Biblical references are taken from the New American Bible, except as noted. 
5 Matthew 10:15. 
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The New American Bible’s translation of ἐπαχύνθη (“gross”) lacks the linguistic nuance of 
“thick” or “dull” found in other translations.  We learn that when people return (ἐπιστρέψωσιν), 
Jesus will heal (ἰάσοµαι) them.  The conversion spoken of here is not the metanoic changing of 
one’s mind and will, but a movement of intransitive return (ἐπιστρέφo), which can be rendered 
as “to turn to one’s self” or “to return.”  What precisely we are to (re)turn to will be treated 
throughout this project.  Jesus’ healing is not of a physical or spiritual ailment, but of a dulled 
imagination.  By imagination (which will be treated more in depth later) we do not mean mere 
fantasy or fancy (as in, “Fancy that!”).  Rather, a Christic imagination takes seriously the finite 
and definite — concrete, material circumstances and images — and glimpses insights of God’s 
divine plan embedded in the finite details.  
 Parables, like the best of fiction, convey not factual history, but they aim to convey truth 
about human nature, relationships, and our place in the cosmos.  After Jesus’ exposition and 
explanation of several parables seed, Matthew recapitulates the centrality of storytelling for 
Jesus: “All these things Jesus spoke to the crowds in parables.  He spoke only in parables to 
fulfill what had been said through the prophet, ‘I will open my mouth in parables, I will 
announce what has lain hidden from the foundation of the world.”6  The Logos becomes 
incarnated in the world; and we are given to understand that (a) meaning is embedded within the 
very foundations of the world (κόσµου), and (b) it is intelligible to those who care to hear it.  
Jesus, who is the Word of God, reveals truths of God under the unassuming guise of story. 
Through parable, Jesus highlights the familiar logic of secular living and challenges his disciples, 
by analogy, to model those behaviors in the sacred realm.  By sanctifying the word, the Word 
models for humanity how to mine creation for truth, and to express that truth through story.  
                                                            
6 Matthew, 13:34-35. The literal Greek records that Jesus “was speaking not without parables,” χωρὶς παραβολῆς 
οὐδὲν ἐλάλει), a litotes designed to emphasize the importance of parables. 
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 To win over the non-believers on the Areopagus, Paul is not above citing secular poets 
familiar to the audience: “For ‘in him we live and move and have our being,’ as even some of 
your poets have said, ‘For we too are his offspring.’”7  That pagan writers such as Aratus and 
Epimenides of Knossos could be elevated to the sacred canon of Christian scripture — 
understood as the revealed word of God — grants us further biblical warrant for considering 
where God’s logos is at work, if imperfectly and incompletely, even in non-religious writing.  
Let us consider now how the tradition understands the role of words — in Scripture and 
sacraments — to point beyond themselves to transcendent reality. 
Sacramental Grounds 
 Augustine on words and Scripture as signs.  In De Doctrina Christiana, St. Augustine 
(354-430) offers a description of the relationship between a res and signum.  A res, in general, is 
something that does not signify something else (quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur, 
I. II.2, 2f.), like a piece of wood, or a stone, or cattle.  But there are res such as smoke or 
footprints, which point beyond themselves to something unseen, such as a fire or an animal.  
These are signs, defined as “things which are used to signify something” (signa, res…quae ad 
significandum aliquid adhibentur I.II.2, IIf.).  Later he writes that “a sign is a thing which causes 
us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the senses” (signum 
est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem 
venire, II.I.1, 5-7).  In other words, a sign is a res which bears a relation to something else.  
Hence a fire, or an animal, may not be visibly present for perception, but their reality is 
nevertheless “learned by their signs” (res per signa discuntur, I.II.2, 1f.). 
 For Augustine, the most important signs that humans employ are words, which point to 
(‘signify’) a reality beyond them.  Like visible smoke, the word “fire” is not a fire itself, but 
                                                            
7 Acts 17:28.   
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points to the res [fire] which exists apart from the word “fire”.  The words we read in Scripture 
are important, in that they seek to point to truths of God, without exhausting the reality of God.  
If we were perfect, Augustine reasons, we wouldn’t need Scripture as a mediator for grasping 
God; but original sin has led to confusion and obscurity, and so we are left striving to understand 
the ambiguities of Scripture.  He writes in book two of De Doctrina Christiana that Scripture’s 
subtleties and ambiguities teach us both humility and patience.  The meaning (of parables, etc.) is 
not readily evident, and so we require humility to be instructed in proper interpretation.  And we 
need patience with Scripture’s obscurities, to reason carefully and make some peace with the 
Ricoeurian surplus of meaning we cannot totally master. 
 Sacraments as signs and causes of grace.  The importance of a signum pointing to res 
beyond them grounds Augustine’s sacramental imagination, as well.  The Christian conception of 
“sacrament” did not emerge immediately; the Acts of the Apostles speaks of the rituals of 
baptism and breaking the bread (Acts 2:38, 41-42), but they were not linked together 
conceptually as sacraments.  Contemporary pagans had used the word µυστήριον – the Greek 
implies something hidden or secret – to describe their own rites of initiation.  To distinguish 
pagan from Christian rites of initiation, Tertullian (150-220) borrowed the Latin sacramentum 
from the oath Roman soldiers professed to the emperor.  In this Christian appropriation, the 
sacramentum signaled a new oath, to Christ, through Baptism and the Eucharist.  
 In Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, a sacramentum is a sacred sign designed by God to point 
to a res divina, a sign which contains that divine reality within itself.8  Elsewhere Augustine 
identifies sacramentum as a visible sign that represents an invisible reality.  In the sacrament of 
Baptism, for example, the visible washing which takes place represents an interior cleansing of 
sin.  Pre-scholastic theologians understood sacramentum to be the “visible form of invisible 
                                                            
8 Augustine of Hippo, De Civitate Dei, Book X Chapter 5. 
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grace” (invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma), and in the 12th century Hugh of St. Victor would 
define sacraments as bodily or material elements that are used in external, sensible ways, which 
– through a certain likeness – make present invisible and spiritual grace.  Later, Peter Lombard 
would argue that the sacrament was a signum of God’s grace and the form of invisible grace, in a 
manner that it was both the image and causa of that grace.”9  This appropriation of Aristotelian 
causal language was the first consideration that a sacrament was a causa of divine grace.  
Aquinas’ more cautious definition was that of a “sign of a sacred reality, to the extent that it 
sanctifies human beings.”10 
 We need not concern ourselves here with an exhaustive history of defining the 
sacraments.  For the scope of our inquiry, it is valuable only to note how difficult it is to pin 
down just what a sacrament “does” vis-a-vis non-visible realities.  Does it point to a reality, 
embody a reality, or both? Does it point to God’s grace, cause grace, or both?  As Herbert 
Vorgrimler notes, “there is no satisfactory general concept of ‘sacrament,’ because there is no 
general sacrament: there are only concrete individual sacraments.  [But] attempts to summarize 
what is common have nevertheless contributed something to our understanding of the 
relationship between God and human beings.”11  Without trying to elaborate a full sacramental 
theology, let us say, with Augustine, that a sacrament is a sacrum signum which points beyond 
the visible to the ultimate, invisible res – God’s grace.   
 It is worth noting that for Augustine, such a sacred sign need not be limited to the seven 
recognized Sacraments of the Church.  In fact, Augustine listed over three hundred sacramenta, a 
                                                            
9 For a full treatment of the development of sacramental theology, see Herbert Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, 
Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994. 
10 Summa Theologiae, III, q.60, a.2. 
11 Herbert Vorgrimler, Sacramental Theology, 43. 
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list later reduced to the seven sacraments we recognize today.12  The others – a group of aids to 
prayer and devotion – came to be known as sacramentals.  In this essay, we will consider the 
extent to which literature, like Scriptural parables and the sacraments, can employ signs that 
point to a res — God’s grace — beyond the visible limits of a text.  Indeed, if words properly 
marshaled can signal a reality beyond them, then literature itself can be fertile ground for a 
properly sacramental imagination.   
 Before we leap into imagination, let us consider a slippery term we have just introduced: 
grace.  What exactly is this “grace” we speak of?  And how does grace relate to nature?  Let us 
consider, in brief, a theology of grace that is suitable for our inquiry into a sacramental 
imagination. 
A Brief History of Grace and Nature in Theology 
 Models of Grace and Nature.  In the history of Christianity, there are alternative 
conceptions of what grace is and how it operates.  Hence how “grace” may be employed in a 
literary imagination depends on one’s theology of grace.  For some, grace is the gift of God’s 
favor which contrasts with our nature.  John Calvin held that grace is adventitious to the natural 
order of things, and indeed runs up against human free will: “For any mixture of the power of 
free will that people strive to mingle with God’s grace is nothing but a corruption of grace.  It is 
just as if one were to dilute wine with muddy, bitter water.”13  This perspective negates human 
nature in order to emphasize divine grace.  The danger is that it denies a goodness to the natural 
order, with grace introduced as an antidote to our irrefragably fallen nature.  What is more, this 
grace is bestowed on some but not all.  If grace is a gratuitous gift from God, then, it cannot be 
                                                            
12 In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, sacraments are still called mysteries. 
13 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion,  (II:V:15) 
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available to all — otherwise it would be a given, not a gift.  For Calvin, there are graced and non-
graced individuals; those predestined, and those consigned to separation from God.   
 A second model typical of the Romantic turn compartmentalizes grace beside nature.  
Schleiermacher maintained that grace is not a knowing or doing, but a feeling interior to the 
subject.  Such a numinous retreat into one’s private “holy place” distances the subject both from 
religious commitments and cool enlightenment rationalism.  Religious commitments are 
abandoned in favor of literary aestheticism.  Worship of a Judeo-Christian God, deemed too 
small for the great modern, gives way to the exaltation of Culture, as prescribed in Matthew 
Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy.   
 A third tenuous relationship of grace and nature comes in the Catholic Neo-Scholastic 
response to modernity in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Here grace is understood as 
hovering somehow above and apart from nature, an external superstructure with little contact 
with humanity, apart from the sacramental life of the Catholic Church.  It bears some 
resemblance to the Calvinist conception of grace, but it differs in that it can be summoned by a 
few ordained stewards.  
 Grace and Nature Together.  In the 13th century Thomas Aquinas maintained that grace 
heals and perfects our nature precisely through the very human acts of knowing and loving.  But 
for Thomas, grace remained an external, objective force, the account of which does not center 
around the “I” subject who encounters such grace.  Yet certain strains of 20th century Catholic 
theology developed an understanding of nature and grace that took cues both from Aquinas and 
the personalist turn in twentieth-century philosophy and theology.  Karl Rahner held that God’s 
grace is co-present to us in our search for meaning, whether we acknowledge it or not.  Such 
grace allows our openness upwards to the infinite horizon, i.e. to the mystery of God.  Grace is 
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directional: God moving in on us, just as God is drawing us out into the abyss, which is God.    
Furthermore grace is not rare and exceptional; it is the air we breathe, a presence constitutive of 
our very being.  For Rahner, there is no pure “nature” apart from grace at work in us.   
 Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan elaborated how the dynamic of grace leads us from 
our subjective experience to an encounter with transcendence:  Our experience of the world 
around us leads us to seek understanding, through reflection on that experience.  From there we 
make a judgment based on competing accounts of understanding.  We thereby move towards 
true, accurate knowledge of reality.  This consciousness leads to an occasion of making a 
decision.  With a sharpened consciousness of reality, our conscience requires that we pursue the 
good we find, leading to a moral conversion.  And for the person open to faith, this pursuit of the 
good opens one to consider the Good, which invites a religious conversion, i.e., to God, our 
ultimate horizon.14  With Lonergan, Rahner conceived of grace as a modification of the 
transcendent experience; grace does not crush or send us out to some distant horizon, 
diminishing or rejecting our human experiences.  Rather, grace helps us to recognize God as that 
intimate presence within.  From this conception of grace, the Church’s mission is no longer 
conceived as saving the massa damnata beyond its visible bounds.  Rather, the Church is called 
to “sniff out” and celebrate God’s grace that is always and everywhere present.  The role of the 
Church is thus to help others name experiences of grace.  
 Vatican II and a World of Grace.  With Lonergan’s and Rahner’s pivotal recasting of 
grace — largely reflected in the conciliar documents of Vatican II — God is not absent from the 
world of our everyday lives, and thus God’s presence can be detected in all truly human 
experiences.   But God is not just another object or person among other objects in the universe; 
God is the very horizon within which we encounter all of created reality.  Whether we have a 
                                                            
14 For more on this, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971), 93–94. 
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thematized belief in God or not, our humanity is inseparable from our saying “yes” to God. Put 
conversely, the only path to experiencing God is through the immediacy of our finite human 
experiences.  To that end, Vatican II names the Church as a sacrament (Lumen Gentium §1), 
which interprets the sacramental signs of the times to find grace active in all dimensions of 
human experience (Gaudium et Spes §4). 
 It should come as no surprise, then, that this would have considerable impact on all 
realms of Catholic intellectual life.  Grace was no longer confined to priests and scholars of 
sacramental theology (groups which tended to overlap).  Indeed any discipline that treats what it 
means to be human could touch on questions of divine grace at work, e.g. Chenu’s optimistic 
rapprochement with secular literary culture.  The 20th century witnessed a considerable flourish 
of Catholic (and other Christian) literary giants whose work, either explicitly or implicitly, 
treated God’s grace at work in the lives of unlikely protagonists.  To this we now turn. 
 
Modern Catholic Thought on Literature 
 Let us call this post-conciliar approach to theology the via litteraria, a way of speaking 
about God through literature.  This via litteraria requires an active, sacramental imagination — 
an imagination keen to uncover grace at work — even where it appears absent.  Examples from 
the 20th century abound: Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited, which follows the meandering 
paths of the Marchmain family.  Chesterton’s Father Brown solved crimes not by Sherlockian 
deduction or superhuman intelligence, but by imagining how he would go about committing such 
crimes, based on what he heard in the confessional.  Consider too the Whiskey Priest in Greene’s 
The Power and the Glory; the Curé de Ambricourt in Bernanos’s Diary of a Country Priest; the 
unlikely heroes of Flannery O’Connor’s short stories.  In each of these cases, God’s grace is co-
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present and active in the unsavory, unheroic characters in spite of their doubts, cowardice and 
trepidations.  Later in the 20th century, American Christian Marilynne Robinson would endeavor 
to recover Calvinism from the dark corner of history.  Her novels, which will be treated 
extensively in a later chapter, are completely in line with the Rahnerian conception of grace 
embedded in the “stuff” of living, moving, and being in the natural world.   
 Before we turn to Robinson, however, we do well to turn to survey twentieth-century 
thought on literature and belief, a field that enjoys the input of several important Catholic 
thinkers.  For the scope of our topic, we will consider the input of Paul Ricoeur, Jacques 
Maritain, Nicholas Boyle and James Foot, put in conversation with several fiction writers, to see 
where the domains of fiction and religious might find resonances.  It will be argued that the via 
litteraria is an exceptional way to speak both (a) of God’s grace operative even in the 
secular realm, and (b) of the contours of faith in a Taylorian secularity 3.   
 Secular vs. Sacred Literature?  As mentioned, Vatican II challenged strict distinctions 
between the sacred and secular.  Here we consider the question of what distinguishes sacred art 
and literature, from “art and literature” in general.  For Paul Ricoeur, any piece of literature and 
poetry can be a vehicle of revelation.  “Revelation” in this initial sense is not necessarily theistic 
or religious; only that it reveals something in the reader.  And unlike scientific discourse or 
ordinary communication, literary language is non-purposive and non-instrumental; it is intended 
for pleasure.  Nicholas Boyle goes further in Sacred and Secular Scriptures, arguing that 
“literature is language free of instrumental purpose, and it seeks to tell the truth.”15  Secular 
literature, Boyle maintains with Aristotle, is designed to give pleasure and entertain.  And the gift 
of poetry and secular literature is that it weaves together words in such a way that the reader 
                                                            
15 Nicholas Boyle, Sacred and Secular Scriptures: A Catholic Approach to Literature (South Bend, IN: University 
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finds analogous revelations that can illuminate and redirect her own life.  In this sense, Boyle 
writes, poetry and literature actually can be truth-telling not by propositional or scientific 
discourse, but through the illumination brought about within the reader.  
 The Christian sacramental imaginary, as it has developed in the 20th century, is keen to 
find grace embedded in the world.  Put in Ricoeur’s terms, for Christians, “the world beyond the 
text” is infused with grace, and the reader’s task is to “sniff out” that grace.  Yet Ricoeur 
maintains that the writtenness of a text sets it free from authorial intent: “What is finally to be 
understood in a text is not the author or his16 presumed intention, nor is it the immanent structure 
or structures of the text, but rather the sort of world intended beyond the text as its reference.”17  
Hence while a text may not purport to be “truth-telling,” it nevertheless stirs the reader to 
consider where truth of humanity is embedded in a text.  But to claim that literature is not 
capable of telling truths of (inter alia) human nature — as Ricoeur does — leaves us wondering 
what this “revelation” consists of, if not some insight into true reality.  Perhaps Ricoeur is 
reluctant to imagine that secular literature is “truth-telling” because it might raise again the 
specter of author’s intention, an intention which he denies.  If secular literature is in the business 
of conveying truth, then it might also affect in some small way how the reader lives her life 
thereafter; such an affect moves it from being merely pleasurable to, in fact, being practical and 
purposive.  Hence Ricoeur boxes secular literature into a non-purposive and pleasurable corner; 
it robs literature of the capacity to speak veridically of human experience.   
 Jacques Maritain wrote in Art and Scholasticism that Christian art is not a matter of 
religious people speaking only of the divine or the sacramental life of the Church.  Rather, the 
                                                            
16 Many of the quotations herein contains gendered language from earlier times; rather than changing Ricoeur’s (and 
several other writers’) pronouns, let us take “man” and “his” to refer to humanity universally, as was presumably the 
intention of the original authors. 
17 Paul Ricoeur, "Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation." The Harvard Theological Review 70, no. 1/2 
(1977), 23. 
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extent to which a work of art (e.g., literature) is undertaken with love makes the work more or 
less “Christian”: 
 The quality of the work is here the reflection of the love from which it issues, 
and which moves the virtue of art instrumentally. Thus it is by reason of an 
intrinsic superelevation that art is Christian, and it is through love that this 
superelevation takes place. It follows from this that the work will be Christian in 
the exact degree in which love is vibrant. Let's make no mistake about it: what is 
required is the very actuality of love, contemplation in charity. Christian work 
would have the artist…[be] possessed by love. Let him then make what he 
wishes.  If the work conveys a note less purely Christian, it is because something 
was lacking in the purity of the love.18 
 
Elsewhere he is more succinct: “the definition of Christian art is to be found in its subject and its 
spirit. Everything, sacred and profane, belongs to it.  God does not ask for ‘religious’ art or 
‘Catholic’ art. The art he wants for himself is Art, with all its teeth.”19  Maritain’s understanding 
of art flows naturally from the belief that grace is embedded in all human situations, regardless 
of whether religious language, themes, or commitments are explicit.  Hence Terence’s humanist 
motto — Homo sum et humani nihil a me alienum puto — permits the Christian to treat all 
fiction as a possible vehicle for revelation.  Flannery O’Connor’s fiction features unsavory 
characters who show us humanity with all its teeth.  Let us turn now to consider her thoughts on 
the role of the Catholic fiction writer. 
 Flannery O’Connor on the Catholic Fiction Writer. In an essay on the Catholic fiction 
writer, O’Connor argues that a writer -- Catholic or otherwise -- is bound not by their faith 
commitments, but by the limits of concrete reality:  
It is generally supposed, and not least by Catholics, that the Catholic who writes 
fiction is out to use fiction to prove the truth of his faith or, at the least, to prove 
the existence of the supernatural. He may be. No one can be sure of his motives 
except as they suggest themselves in his finished work, but when the finished 
work suggests that pertinent actions have been fraudulently manipulated or 
overlooked or smothered, whatever purposes the writer started out with have 
already been defeated. What the fiction writer will discover, if he discovers 
anything at all, is that he himself cannot move or mold reality in the interests of 
abstract truth. The writer learns, perhaps more quickly than the reader, to be 
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19 Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, Book VIII. 
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humble in the face of what is. What is is all he has to do with; the concrete is his 
medium; and he will realize eventually that fiction can transcend its limitations 
only by staying within them.20 
 
The fiction writer of any (or no) religious commitment endeavors to describe the concrete as s/he 
sees it; when the work manipulates or shoe-horns reality into a theological framework — or 
appears to do so — the author’s purpose is compromised and defeated.  Insofar as lying is a 
deliberate misrepresentation of reality, then such writing is, effectively, lying.  
Put another way, a religious-minded writer need not cut out or deny parts of the human 
experience to fit an abstract narrative of theology.  An honest — i.e., intending to convey reality 
accurately — theological imagination takes full account of the natural world and the human 
heart’s caprices within it.  As O’Connor notes, “The limitations that any writer imposes on his 
work will grow out of the necessities that lie in the material itself, and these will generally be 
more rigorous than any that religion could impose.”21  The question of grace, as we noted earlier, 
revolves around whether grace is embedded in nature, adventitious to it, or wholly external to it.  
As O’Connor sees it, “[p]art of the complexity of the problem for the Catholic fiction-writer will 
be the presence of grace as it appears in nature, and what matters for him here is that his faith not 
become detached from his dramatic sense and from his vision of what is.”  Artists such as 
O’Connor and Robinson succeed precisely by training our imagination on the earthy 
concreteness of graced moments.    
But the Christian fiction writer risks bait-and-switching her readers, springboarding from 
the natural world into the fuzzy realm of disembodied grace.  The careful reader rightly enquires 
why the author has moved from describing reality to prescribing reality.  Such a disjuncture 
proposes, for O’Connor, a disembodied supernatural world apart from a brutish natural world of 
                                                            
20 Flannery O’Connor, “The Church and the Fiction Writer: From March 30, 1957” in America. Emphasis added. 
21 O’Connor, “The Church and the Fiction Writer: From March 30, 1957” 
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good and evil.  The result is abstract pieties about grace, hovering beyond the Manichean world 
of the good and evil, of the sacred and the secular.  And the reader looking for a clean division 
between the innocent and obscene “would seem to prefer the former, while being more of an 
authority on the latter, but the similarity between the two generally escapes him. He forgets that 
sentimentality is an excess, a distortion of sentiment, usually in the direction of an overemphasis 
on innocence; and that innocence, whenever it is overemphasized in the ordinary human 
condition, tends by some natural law to become its opposite.”22  Solzhenitsyn notes that the line 
of good and evil runs through the heart of every person, and the greatest writers, Christian or 
otherwise, recognizes that complexity and seeks to describe it.  To skip over human frailties and 
fallibility, O’Connor concludes, does not do justice to the story of Christ’s own death and 
redemption. 
O’Connor notes, too, that a Christian writer ought not shy away from describing the 
incongruities of concrete reality, precisely because of the broader Christian vision of redemption: 
“If the writer uses his eyes in the real security of his faith, he will be obliged to use them 
honestly and his sense of mystery and his acceptance of it will be increased. To look at the worst 
will be for him no more than an act of trust in God.”23  Literature by Christians, done well, does 
not force the reader to accept a Christian worldview, but draws her to consider the layered 
dimensions — the “surplus of meaning” — embedded in finite characters and plot details. 
O’Connor writes, “the Catholic writer and reader will have to remember…that the reality of the 
added dimension will be judged in a work of fiction by the truthfulness and wholeness of the 
literal level of the natural events presented.”  In his masterful new book Wounded Angel, Paul 
Lakeland argues that the best “literature is propaedeutic to faith, in that it throws up innumerable 
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possibilities of access to transcendence.  Literature, one might say, warms up the human capacity 
for faith, but it does not cause it, still less does it command it.”24  So how does literature exactly  
‘warm up’ a reader for the capacity of faith? 
 The interior monologue of a protagonist entails a record of thinking, rather than a record 
of stable thoughts.  So too on one’s journey of faith, wherein one regularly entertains doubts, 
experiences glimpses of God’s hand at work, but feels abandoned in the next moment.  The life 
of faith is less a list of propositional claims, and more the sustained attention to meaning 
embedded in the world.  When asked what role faith plays in her life, Robinson offered, 
“Frankly, I don’t know what faith in God means. For me, the experience is much more a sense of 
God. Nothing could be more miraculous than the fact that we have a consciousness that makes 
the world intelligible to us and are moved by what is beautiful.”25  One danger for religious 
fiction is in offering images that are mawkishly sentimental and admit of only one interpretation.  
Indeed much “religious fiction” is dismissed on the grounds of being overly saccharine or 
didactic.  Like pulp fiction meant primarily to entertain, such literature does not invite various 
interpretations of the world of the text; it merely states what it is.   
 In other words, quality fiction must discover as it goes, exploring the prior existence of 
the world around it.  Readers, too stumble along the text and, in a sense, ‘discover’ details as 
they go along.  James Wood writes that “fiction should seem to offer itself to the reader’s 
completion, not to the writer’s.  This whisper of conspiracy is one of fiction’s necessary 
beauties.”26   We find in fiction a false bottom to the world we have seen up to this point, and we 
are led to discover a world in the text analogous to, but not identical with, the world we already 
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25 Sarah Fay, “Marilynne Robinson, The Art of Fiction No. 198” interview in Paris Review Issue 186. 
26 James Wood, “Julian Barnes and the Problem of Knowing Too Much” in The Broken Estate, 238 
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know.  Great fiction, Wood writes, “must not stroke the known but distress the undiscovered.”27   
This probing of the not-yet-discovered is the task of the imaginations of writer, character, and 
reader alike.  The protagonist in a story might turn over in her head different interpretations of 
life events, stimulating a similar imaginative activity in the reader.  As Aquinas notes, “when we 
wish to make someone understand something, we lay examples before him from which he can 
form phantasms for the purpose of understanding.”28  Adapted to our discussion, we might say 
that the path towards revelatory understanding in the text stimulates the act of understanding in 
the reader; the reader participates in the discovery of meaning.  This act of the reader requires an 
engaged imagination; let us turn now to consider what this imagination is, and how it operates. 
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28 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, 84, 7. 
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Chapter II: Literary & Theological Imaginations 
 
Imagination vs. Fancy 
Worthy fiction, as will be argued later, requires a generous imagination on the part of 
both the writer and reader of literature.  In common parlance, imagination gets a bad rap; people 
say “you’re just imagining things!” or “that’s a figment of your imagination” to dispel unreal 
fantasies.  But that is not how we employ the word “imagination” here.  Before we treat the 
dynamics of theology and literature, let us take a brief survey of what does and does not 
constitute a literary imagination.   
 We might find it strange to begin our treatment of a Christian imagination in the 
Romantic period.  Though most Romantic writers would not readily identify as (more than 
culturally) Christian, they were masters at expressing a reverence for the numinous and sublime.  
Their appreciation for transcendence puts them closer to traditional theism than to the 
Enlightenment rationalism to which they were primarily responding.  And given this shared 
appreciation for transcendence, we can take from them some insights on the creative power of 
the imagination to explore realities beyond the empirically demonstrable.    
Coleridge’s Imagination(s). Samuel Taylor Coleridge is perhaps best known for his 
poem, Rime of the Ancient Mariner, yet his work in developing a distinctly Romantic 
epistemology provides a helpful distinction for our conversation.  In his less-than-cogent 
Biographia Litteraria, Coleridge identifies three related but distinct creative capacities of the 
human mind.  The first and second deal with the imagination: “The primary Imagination [sic] I 
hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.”29  Coleridge’s primary imagination 
                                                            
29 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 248. Emphasis added. 
Simmons 
 
25 
labors in the finite mind just as God’s eternal act of creation labors to sustain all being.  This act 
of imagination occurs even unconsciously, as when the mind gives some order to apparent chaos, 
or when the mind produces images.  Anyone who summons to mind the image of her father, or 
the sound of his voice, is engaging her primary imagination.  Next is the secondary imagination, 
which Coleridge considers, “an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, 
yet…differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, 
in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles 
to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed 
and dead.”30  This secondary imaginative faculty is engaged by poets and writers who engage in 
active poiesis — from the Greek verb poieo, “to make” — seeking to shape disparate parts into a 
unified whole.  Coleridge coins the term esemplastic (“shaping into one”) to describe this power 
of an artist to “dissolve and diffuse” elements in order to create new, cogent ideas.  To that end, 
Coleridge’s secondary imagination strives to coalesce matter and spirit, intellect and feelings, 
etc.  This advanced poetic faculty, he reasons, is reserved for truly great artisans, like Coleridge’s 
inspiration, William Wordsworth. 
  But both the primary and secondary imaginations remain different from a third faculty of 
the mind, “fancy” (etymologically, a contraction of fantasy).  The faculty of fancy does not 
create, but recombines existing “fixities and definites” in a “mode of memory emancipated from 
the order of time and space.”31  A child might fancy a unicorn driving a car, or a poor man 
fancies being wealthy and living in a mansion.  In both cases, elements of reality (horse + one 
horn + car, man + cash + mansion) are spun together to create an unbounded unreality.  While 
Coleridge is not altogether clear on defining fancy, we might take from him the important 
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distinction that imagination — as we are employing it here — is entirely different from mere 
fancy.  Our conversation understands imagination along the lines of Coleridge’s passive, primary 
imagination and active “secondary imagination.”  These imaginative faculties aim at expressing 
the reality of life and human longings; as O’Connor has argued – and William Lynch will – the 
Christian imagination must take seriously the bounds of the concrete, if it is to be taken seriously 
as literature.  Let us attempt now to construct a theology of the imagination. 
A Theology of Imagination 
 
George MacDonald.  Scottish novelist and Calvinist preacher George MacDonald (1824-
1905) offers a helpful formula for relating the creative imagination of the artist to the creative 
work of God.  Imago simply means “likeness,” and imaginatio is the process of rendering such a 
likeness.  The imagination, for MacDonald, is the faculty “which gives form to thought--not 
necessarily uttered form, but form capable of being uttered in shape or in sound, or in any mode 
upon which the senses can lay hold. It is, therefore, that faculty in man32 which is likest to the 
prime operation of the power of God, and has, therefore, been called the creative faculty, and its 
exercise creation.”33 Just as humankind is made in imagine Dei, so too all functions of the 
human intellect are patterned on the intellect of God.  Thus MacDonald concludes that the 
imagination of humans is made “in the image of the imagination of God.”  In other words, what 
God’s creative act is to creation, so the artist’s imagination is to her painting, story, poem, etc.   
But this is no mere analogy, writes MacDonald.  For whatever the human creates is 
ultimately created by God: “Everything of man must have been of God first; and it will help 
much towards our understanding of the imagination and its functions in man if we first succeed 
in regarding aright the imagination of God, in which the imagination of man lives and moves and 
                                                            
32 As noted earlier, rather than re-word all of MacDonald’s and others’ quotations to be gender inclusive, let us 
understand ‘man’ in its intended universal sense. 
33 George MacDonald, “On the Imagination: Its Function and Its Culture,” in A Dish of Orts. 
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has its being.”  Just as the playwright writes characters, setting, plot and chorus, so God creates 
‘actors’ (humans) on a stage (the world) to act (live the drama of life) with a chorus (birds and 
such) providing aesthetic accompaniment.  “As the thoughts move in the mind of a man, so move 
the worlds of men and women in the mind of God, and make no confusion there, for there they 
had their birth, the offspring of his imagination. Man is but a thought of God.”  One wonders if 
Marilynne Robinson (a Calvinist at heart) had MacDonald in mind when she wrote in Gilead: 
Calvin says somewhere that each of us is an actor on a stage and God is the 
audience. That metaphor has always interested me, because it makes us artists of 
our behavior, and the reaction of God to us might be thought of as aesthetic 
rather than morally judgmental in the ordinary sense. …[I]t suggests how God 
might actually enjoy us. I believe we think about that far too little. It would be a 
way into understanding essential things, since presumably the world exists for 
God's enjoyment.34 
 
The goal of a properly Christian imagination, for MacDonald, is to create beautiful things that 
raise the mind from creata to creator.  “To do this, the man must watch its signs, its 
manifestations. He must contemplate what the Hebrew poets call the works of His hands.” Thus 
a concerted attention to natural effects is the path by which we reason – or imagine – our way to 
the creative cause.  Robinson writes that “so much of our beauty is inward, in the agility of our 
minds and souls, in the workings of memory and the capacity for art and invention… Given that 
beauty is…the signature of the divine in creation, that the aesthetic should be an aspect of human 
nature that reveals our affinity to God simply follows.”35  We are created not only to behold 
beauty, but to ponder its aesthetic origins and participate in the creative act ourselves.    But how 
does one make this ascent from creation to creator?  William Lynch offers theological and 
literary insights on this path from the finite to the infinite. 
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William Lynch and Embracing the Finite.  Aesthetics alone can disappoint, if it does not 
take seriously the embodiedness of our existential hunger.  In his groundbreaking work Christ 
and Apollo, Jesuit William Lynch (1908-1987) rejected aesthetic theories of literature that did not 
sufficiently take account of our finite embodiment.  He despaired of the ‘cultured gentleman’ 
who is encouraged to take literature courses in college merely for literature’s sake, a diversion 
from the banalities of everyday life, as if “literature is wonderful [but] has nothing to do with 
anything.”36  Isolating literary study as a field unto itself, apart from human experience, Lynch 
reasons, is the cause of the downfall of interest in literature. (We might say the same for abstract 
theological inquiry!)  Rather “the literary process is a highly cognitive passage through the finite 
and definite realities of man and the world.”37  
Finite human experiences, Lynch maintains, submit to multiple interpretive dimensions of 
meaning, which can open up a reader to consider her theological origins.  But the deeper 
dimensions only open up through particulars; appeals to non-descript generalities about 
humanity do not, for Lynch, give an adequate account for what it means to be human, precisely 
because they overlook human finitude.   Lynch’s book sets Christ – the embodiment of infinity in 
the finite – against Apollo.  Lynch suggests we “let Apollo stand for everything that is weak and 
pejorative in the ‘aesthetic man’ of Kierkegaard, and for that kind of fantasy beauty which is a 
sort of infinite, which is easily gotten everywhere, but which will not abide the straitened gates 
of limitation that leads to stronger beauty.”38    
In Lynch’s schema, basic human insights (psychological, theological, etc.) never arrive 
unmediated. One’s knowledge is mediated by the finite and limited experience of the individual.  
Duns Scotus spoke of the thisness (haecceitas) of reality, and Lynch ties whatever insights we 
                                                            
36 William Lynch, Christ and Apollo, 2. 
37 Lynch, 3. 
38 Lynch, 5. 
Simmons 
 
29 
gain to our very haecceity.  Thus we should not – per Plato’s suggestion – hurry too quickly from 
the many to the One, ignoring our finite experience in searching elsewhere for God and truth.  
Particularity is the bearer of truth, and “images are in themselves the path to whatever the self is 
seeking: to insight, beauty, or for that matter, to God.”39  
Redolent of Lonergan’s epistemological ascent to insight and conversion, Lynch argues 
that there are no shortcuts to beauty or to insight, and “we waste our time if we try to go around 
or above or under the definite; we must literally go through it” (Lynch, 16).  Lynch identifies 
four typical ways, in literature and theology, of avoiding the finite: 
(1) The first he terms the “magical view” whereby finite things – people, things, etc. – 
are exploited to put one in touch with numinous visions of beauty or God.  The finite acts as “a 
bag of tricks…to send the soul shooting up, one knows not how, into some kind of infinite or 
absolute; that accomplished, the devil take the finite” (Lynch, 17).  The fruit of this, he warns, is 
the devaluation of the world’s material reality, which plays out even in certain strains of Catholic 
sacramentality.  Our finitude is a springboard into the heavens, but is not taken as a serious 
element of the really real.   
(2) A second misapprehension of the finite deals with an overly immanent view of the 
finite.  Here the imagination is employed to create a pleasurable aesthetic, a cultivated affectivity, 
a garden of pathos within oneself.  Lynch names this intensified subjectivity “psychologism,” 
which distorts or reduces the material reality of the external world to satisfy the interior subject.  
Theologically, Lynch finds a corollary in speculative theology and in the modernist movement of 
the 19th century within Catholicism, “in which all dogma was safely removed from application to 
the real and reduced to a set of symbols for the production of religious affectivity.”40   
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(3) A third misprision of the finite is what he calls the “imagination of the double 
vacuum,” pitting heaven and earth against one another.  Here the imagination is employed to 
mine the incongruities and limits of the world to instill revulsion.  Feelings of disgust, boredom, 
or anger at this fallen world propel the imagination to, in an act of rebellion, escape “into a 
tenuous world of infinite bliss” (Lynch, 19).  One views only the most unsavory elements of 
embodiment and seeks to flee: better the hoary hopes of the heavens than the felt flatness of 
finitude.  Lynch finds Graham Greene to be a literary exemplum to this perspective, and Karl 
Barth a theological one.  For Barth, the Christ event comes to cancel human history, not valorize 
it: “[Christ’s] greatest achievement is a negative achievement…On the day when mankind is 
dissolved the new era of the righteousness of God will be inaugurated.”41  It is worth noting that 
Christ and Apollo was published in 1960, shortly before Vatican II would reassess the 
relationship of the Church and the world. 
(4) The final group consists of “facers of facts” – those who size up finite reality and find 
it to be a meaningless hellscape.  Hence the “beautiful thing, say these facers of facts, is to accept 
the absurdity and limitation of reality with nerve, sincerity, courage, and authenticity.”42  
Rahner’s “On the Theology of the Incarnation” articulates this cynical perspective: “Man has 
ultimately no choice.  He understands himself as a mere void, which one can encompass only to 
note with the cynical laughter of the damned, that there is nothing behind it.”43  Finite reality 
reveals only a closed finitude, with no exit – to borrow from Sartre – to the salubrious vacuum of 
heaven.  Lynch places most existentialist literature (e.g., Camus) into this category. 
 Each of these four errant perspectives fails to take seriously the finite’s capacity to 
generate insight from our embodiment.  But “with every plunge through, or down into, the real 
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contours of being, the imagination shoots up into insight, but in such a way that the plunge down 
causally generates the plunge up.”44  Lynch diagrams this movement (from 1 to 2) as follows: 
 
The astute theologian will notice that Lynch’s schema is patterned on the incarnational exitus-
reditus of Christian anthropology.  In the Incarnation event, the infinite God takes on the finite, 
and models for humanity how to return to God.  All of humanity proceeds from God (exitus), and 
through Christ is shown the way home (reditus).  According to Aquinas, this exitus-reditus is 
patterned on the inner life of the Trinity. The Son (Logos) proceeds from the Father (a procession 
of knowledge) and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son (the procession of love).  
This patterns humanity’s exitus as creatures capable of knowing and loving.  Aquinas notes, “the 
only-begotten Son of God, wanting to make us sharers in his divinity [2 Peter 1:4], assumed our 
nature, so that he, made man, might make men gods.”45  For Aquinas, humanity’s reditus to God 
opens us to supernatural knowing and loving – indeed, to deification.  Our hunger is real, and 
will only be sated by returning to the mystery of God.   
 Lynch employs this same Aristotelian dive into the finite, to explain how we come to 
knowledge (insight) by engaging seriously the finitude of our existence.  Though the diagraming 
is different, we find parallels to Lonergan’s epistemological ascent from experience and 
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reflection, upward to insight.  We will now explain, in brief, Lynch’s movement from the finite to 
insight. 
 Finite Embodiment Teaches. For Lynch, the question of time is the horizontal aspect of 
the finite.  The “inexorable flow of temporality” permits nothing from the past or present to 
survive the instant, and the future remains an as-yet unknown.  Humanity, in its creaturely angst, 
rebels against this in countless ways (in literature and habits of life like), as if one could preserve 
moments of peace, youth, vitality, and goodness in a single atemporal instance.  Certain literary 
currents and philosophical trends prize a detached appreciation for the infinite and abstract: “The 
man of the infinite bears the marks of romantic enthusiasm, apparent greatness of soul, 
imagination, and ambition, while he who chooses and respects the finite, the limited, and 
concrete actual as a way to glory and beauty…comes to be regarded as an unimaginative plodder 
and an intellectual primitive.”46  Highly imaginative literary works, such as Marcel Proust’s 
Remembrance of Things Past, and movements in art (such as Picasso’s Cubist paintings) seek to 
condense all of time into a single, multi-dimensional moment that steps out of time. 
 For those aspiring to possess a “pure intelligence, with its aspirations toward brilliant, 
univocal clarity, inflexibility, totality of vision and simultaneity,” engaging the temporal and 
finite is effectively submitting to death.47  But the finite intelligence – Lynch’s term for those 
willing to engage the finite and concrete – takes seriously all the dimensions of death.  There is 
the death of every moment – the past which we will not get back. But also the rhythms of human 
life, which Lynch describes as “a moving structure of phases (birth, childhood, adolescence, 
prime, middle age, old age, death) so put together as by its very movement to produce insight 
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and illumination,” insights which defy static, logical reasoning (Lynch, 58).  Whatever elevated 
insights one attains are won through living the course of her life.   
In Housekeeping, Marilynne Robinson has the narrator rebel against the tedium of time’s 
march: 
“I hated waiting. If I had one particular complaint, it was that my life seemed 
composed entirely of expectation. I expected—an arrival, an explanation, an 
apology. There had never been one, a fact I could have accepted, were it not true 
that, just when I had got used to the limits and dimensions of one moment, I was 
expelled into the next and made to wonder again if any shapes hid in its 
shadows.48  
 
But this rumination on the monotony of time moves her from bored disappointment to hope for 
something that lies beyond the present: “That most moments were substantially the same did not 
detract at all from the possibility that the next moment might be utterly different. And so the ordinary 
demanded unblinking attention. Any tedious hour might be the last of its kind.”49 
 For Lynch, attempts to retreat to the life of the mind, apart from serious engagement with 
the concrete realities of existence, yield not insight but sickness: “We pay a terrible price if we 
try to remain children in the literal temporal sense; in fact, we grow old before our time because 
of all the stresses and strains of the fight against time.”50  Lynch’s insights dovetail with our 
earlier discussion on the relationship of nature and grace.  For Lynch, we do not come to insight 
about ourselves, others, or God, apart from engaging the finite.  Rahner argues that God’s grace 
is to be discovered not in the heavens but in the concrete experiences of our interiority: “When 
the longing for the absolute nearness of God, the longing, incomprehensible in itself…looks for 
where this nearness came—not in the postulates of the spirit, but in the flesh and in the housings 
of the earth, then no resting-place can be found except in Jesus of Nazareth, over whom the star 
of God stands, before whom alone one has the courage to bend the knee and weeping happily to 
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pray: ‘And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us’.”51  Rahner and Lynch remind us that 
if God should choose to share our lot of finitude, then all earnest inquiries into the divine should 
begin with probing the layers of meaning that our singular life has to offer.   
 For the purpose of our discussion of theology and literature, MacDonald has offered us 
some helpful insights. Just as God’s infinite act of creative imagination yields the sensible world, 
so the finite imagination can produce a finite “world of the text” which invites multiple layered, 
and even competing, interpretations.  Creation, like the best of fiction, invites wonder and 
scrutiny of purpose; but they elude exhaustive explanation.  We will now consider what 
constitutes worthy literature, and how it might lead to consider a life of faith. 
Literature as an Act of Faith 
 
Wolfgang Iser on Attitude vs. Interpretation.  To this point we have made only vague 
reference to distinctions between pleasure reading and the great literature that occupies our 
inquiry’s attention.  But this distinction is important, because it clarifies the purpose of any given 
work of fiction.  Wolfgang Iser proposes an aesthetic response theory of writing, wherein fiction 
differs from purely informational prose.  One is seeking to be informed, not entertained; in such 
prose, metaphor and ambiguity are undesirable, lest the reader be misled, e.g., directions to the 
museum.  Fiction, by contrast, does not aim primarily to inform, but to entertain.  Within fiction, 
there are entertaining pieces of fiction — detective stories, pulp fiction, so-called “trashy novels” 
— whose primary goal is to recount a clear plot and entertain us, but there is not much room for 
interpretation or ambiguity.  The goal is not to redirect the imagination or soul of the reader, but 
to convey ‘facts’ of a storyline, to keep the reader pleasantly engaged.  For such writing, the 
meaning floats close to the surface of the text.  It invites an attitudinal response in the reader (“I 
like this story/I don’t like this story”).  To call it “light reading” is not to disparage it, only to 
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identify that it does not weigh heavily on the mind or soul of the reader; it does not “lay a claim” 
on the reader as the second type of fiction does, what Iser calls “heavy reading.”  This latter type 
of reading offers multiple interpretations of the raw ‘facts’ of the story.  In such writing, the 
meaning of events is not explicit, meaning that “the formulation will take place through the 
guided activity stimulated in the reader.”52  Here the reader’s response is not merely attitudinal, 
but interpretive.  This is not to say such texts are thicker, use bigger words, and treat only grown-
up topics.  Children’s books such as The Giving Tree or Chronicles of Narnia, in spite of their 
simple prose and plot, invite the reader to self-reflection and interpretive appropriation.  
Similarly, a murder-mystery may be written for adults, but the text may not “read us” or call 
from us an interpretative response. 
Lakeland’s Attitudinizers vs. Interpreters.  Lakeland draws Iserian parallels to the act of 
faith in our modern time.  In the past, people may have simply accepted or rejected the claims of 
religious faith (“I like this story/I don’t like this story”).  The act of faith, as treated in medieval 
Christian though, did not begin with subjectivity, but with universal principles of human 
cognition, will, and intellect.  But in the 19th century, the turn to the subject began to ask who the 
“I” is.  In the phrase, “I believe,” there is not just the one question (what is belief?), but a second: 
who is this “I” that is (or isn’t) believing?  Here again Taylor’s idea of secularity 3 proves 
helpful, in conveying the modern condition wherein the (un-)believing subject feels the cross-
pressures both of personal identity, and belief/unbelief.   The modern person of faith does more 
than accept or reject belief; she constantly interprets the faith-encounter as reliable or not; 
worthy or not.  As Lakeland puts it, “Today the act of faith is the acceptance of a claim upon us, 
one by means of which we interpret the secular world.  Once we had believers and atheists.  
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Today we have interpreters and attitudinizers.”53  Attitudinizers, he reasons, consider the secular 
world as a given, and seek either to accept or reject it (and in rejecting, perhaps they desire to 
change it for the better).  But interpreters situate the material universe in a larger framework; 
without this external framework, the reasoning goes, one is unable to interpret it.  “They may and 
do share much with those attitudinizers who recognize the ills of the secular world and wish to 
change it, but they will part company when asked why.”54   Where an attitudinizer might find 
certain elements of the world repugnant — suffering, poverty, sickness— the interpreter may 
share those sympathies, but situates them in a larger cosmic drama.   
Like Iser’s distinction, Lakeland’s dichotomy may be too simplistic.  Today there are 
certainly those who find their (un)belief very uncomplicated.  One may possess a simple, 
unproblematized faith in God — “I like this story,” full stop.  There are likewise others who find 
the act of faith simply impossible — “I don’t like this story.”  But in Secularity 3, many stand 
somewhere in the middle; they are cognitively open to a possible act of faith, but they may not 
know precisely what constitutes an authentic response.  For them, the act of faith is not merely a 
matter of taste, but of interpreting well the raw data of life.  To that end, Iser’s distinction of 
types of texts is helpful.  We first encounter texts which are strictly informational; they intend to 
convey information that explicitly intend one meaning, e.g., a recipe, or a how-to guide to sink 
repair.  Next there are texts of fiction whose goal is entertainment (the aforementioned “light 
reading”).  This is the unthinking reading suitable for the beach.  But substantial, “literary 
fiction,” requires the reader to actively engage her imagination in encountering the text.  This 
“literary fiction” deliberately employs subtleties and ambiguities, suggestions and hints, that 
allow the reading subject to mine the text, uncovering meaning(s) for herself.  Put different, 
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meaning emerges between the subjectivity of the reader and the objective writtenness of the text.  
For Iser, the aesthetic object is neither the text per se, nor merely the reader-response (what does 
it mean in me?), but the convergence of reader-and-text.  If a piece of fiction yields only a 
univocal meaning, the reader’s primary task is confined to determine that one meaning (as with 
“light reading”).  Conversely if the reading subject insists only on her own meaning — “the only 
meaning is what I find” — then nothing sensible can be said of meanings embedded in the text.   
The Iserian aesthetic object thus emerges from placing a literary text in dialogue with a 
reader’s response.  Like in interpersonal interactions, a “conversation” does not neatly reside in 
one or the other party, but in the space of interaction between the two.  Iser’s aesthetic theory 
proves helpful for our discussion of great literature, in that it does not reduce literature’s meaning 
either to the text or to the reader, but in that imaginative space in between.  Lakeland calls this 
space between reader and writer “the place and time where the creativity of the author and the 
imagination of the reader conspire together to illuminate the enigmas of human life.”55  The 
focus of our discussion, then, is on this Iserian “literary fiction,” which admits of multiple 
interpretations in a space of convergence between reader and text.  Iser and Lakeland, like 
O’Connor before them, have argued that the best of literature invites interpretation on the part of 
the reader.  But even before the interpretive act of reading, there is an implicit trust – a faith – 
established between writer and reader which merits our attention.  I will argue that this is the 
same space within which the individual in secularity 3 makes an interpretive act of faith. 
 
The Act of Faith and Act of Writing/Reading Considered 
 
We turn now to consider what act(s) of faith are involved in the production and reception 
of narrative texts.  Let us begin this by recalling the production and reception of Scriptural texts 
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– the Bible – at the heart of Christianity.  The perception that Christianity requires believers to 
cling to an improbable set of beliefs is, from the outside, not ungrounded; indeed the Christian 
makes some non-negotiable propositional claims: first, that an infinite God exists, and second, 
that this God elected to become human to save humanity.  We will treat each in turn.  First, the 
question of an infinite God.  “Why do you torment me with your infinity, if I can never really 
measure it?” Karl Rahner asks in his slim volume Encounters with Silence. “Why have you 
kindled in me the flame of faith, this ‘dark light’ which lures us out of the bright security of our 
little huts into your sight?”  The task of theology can be imprecise and slippery; our meager 
attempt to describe the infinite with finite reason, language, etc.  One is struck by the magnitude 
of an infinite God, and the phrase struck by is fitting.  People of faith are often struck from 
without or within, by an impulse that there is more to reality than meets the eye, that the 
language and words we have are insufficient to describe all of reality.  For the Christian, God’s 
self-revelation, by which God interrupts humanity, is the impetus and epistemic grounds of faith. 
The Word that exegetes.  In the Prologue to the Gospel of John, humanity moves from 
darkness and incomprehension to light and understanding, but not by our own intellect.  We are 
given to understand that the Word, Logos, was present from the beginning, was with God, and 
indeed was God.  All that exists, came to be through the Word.  Without the Word, nothing came 
to be.  What came to be through the Word was life, we are told, which is the “light of the human 
race” (Jn 1:4).  This light shines in the darkness, and the “darkness has not overcome it.” (Jn 1:5).  
The verb employed (κατέλαβεν, from λαµβάνω) hints not only at overcoming, but also 
grasping/comprehending.  We, too, encounter the darkness of not fully grasping the immensity of 
God, who is beyond our epistemological grasp and language.  Hence in John 1:18, we read, “No 
one has ever yet seen God.  The only Son, God, who is at the Father’s bosom, has revealed 
Simmons 
 
39 
(ἐξηγήσατο) him.”  “What would God, if there is a god, look like?” we ask ourselves, with the 
spiritual longing that Rahner mentions.  If John’s testimony is any indication, God “looks like” 
Jesus, who is at God’s side.  This Logos reveals – the Word exegetes (ἐξηγήσατο) -- God for our 
human comprehension.   
If the divine Logos is capable of exegeting God for us, then we do well to pay attention to 
the exegetical power of human words to point beyond themselves, drawing us beyond the “false 
bottom” of human experience.  Rahner treats the task of the artist — the writer, the poet, etc. — 
to use words to push the comfortable limits of our comprehension: “If God’s incomprehensibility 
does not grip us in a word, if it does not draw us on into his superluminous darkness, if it does 
not call us out of the little house of our homely, clues-hugged truths into the strangeness of the 
night that is our real home, we have misunderstood or failed to understand the words of 
Christianity.”56   
Words Indicate Without Exhausting Mystery.  For the Christian, faith does not presume 
to utter a final word on mystery, so much as name a felt depth of experiences beyond the readily 
explicable; a sense that there is more to the story in times of loneliness and fullness, sorrow and 
ecstasy, grief and joy.  Anthony Domestico describes the shared frustration of the theologian and 
the poet; both “inevitably reach a moment when words fail, when the vision so exceeds its 
expression that an admission of defeat becomes the best way to express that vision.”57  Both poet 
and theologian can demarcate the limits of their arsenal of words; and in demarcating, they 
acknowledge a space beyond. 
Where theologians attempt veridical statements about the mystery of God, the writer of 
fiction sets out to capture the humanity of his or her characters.  In the process of making real a 
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character, the character may challenge the author’s intended plans.  Robinson describes the 
“emotional entanglement” that occurs in writing: “The characters that interest me are the ones 
that seem to pose questions in my own thinking.  The minute you start thinking about someone in 
the whole circumstance of his life to the extent that you can, he becomes mysterious, 
immediately.”58  To begin to write requires trust that illumination will come in the offing; let us 
consider what acts of faith are undertaken by a writer. 
Actus scriptoris takes place in a “faith” community.  Rowan Williams finds that the 
poetic (i.e., “maker” of art) imagination itself requires an act of faith in the face of one’s 
uncertainty: “Poetry is always a risky enterprise. You don’t know where you’re going when you 
start writing. One thing you do know is that you’re not going to exhaust what you’re talking 
about; the willingness to take the next step, to put the next word down, is itself an act of faith. 
You know you’re not going to encompass it, conquer or control it. That’s what makes poetry an 
act of faith.59”  This act of faith, of submitting one’s written word to others for evaluation and 
intelligible reception, we will call an actus scriptoris. The writer makes this act of faith within 
concentric communities that entail trust.  There is a broad linguistic community, with shared 
understanding of words’ meanings and metaphorical signaling.  Therein lies a literary 
community of fellow writers, who inspire and challenge the writer to describe a fresh reality, or 
to treat a familiar reality in a creative, new fashion.  There is one’s community of critics — many 
of whom are fellow writers — who assess the merits of the writer’s submission for quality, 
novelty, depth and (importantly) accuracy in describing some dimension of reality.  Even 
science- and fantasy fiction aspire to convey truths of reality, if only by taking themes (e.g., 
valor, loss, fear, racisim, etc.) out of their traditional contexts to highlight the chosen dimensions.   
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Reader’s act of faith and the Moi Aussi Moment.  There is, furthermore, a reading 
community who, by virtue of their shared act of reading, negotiate the meaning and veridical 
weight of the text vis-à-vis their own experience and sensibilities.  There is, Williams maintains, 
great faith involved in the whole affair of writing for readers: “The trust that I am understood. 
The trust that I will discover something by speaking. By listening. The trust that our words are 
not, as some philosophers would like them to be, games in the dark.”60  Aristotle’s Poetics 
articulates that the chief aim of a work of theater or fiction — e.g., a comedy or tragedy — is 
pleasure.  We enjoy a tragedy not for the pain or loss characters undergo (unless we happen to be 
sadistic!).  Rather we enjoy the representation of their plight to the extent that they enact a reality 
that, though different, nevertheless finds cognitive, emotional, or spiritual resonance with one’s 
own experience of reality.  The truth of such representations lies not in the artificial ‘facts’ of the 
plot, but in how beautifully, how human(e)ly, the story is enacted.   
Poetic representation is undertaken not just for one’s own pleasure, but for a community 
of others to appreciate.  Whatever pleasure we may take in a tragedy lies in a shared 
understanding of loss and pain.  Whatever consolation we draw from a tragedy comes from the 
solidarity of silent head nods, of moi aussi moments of insight while reading or spectating: “My 
struggles and joys are not aberrations in the universe, but constitutive of human experience.”  To 
this extent it makes no difference whether a community observes a play in common, or reads the 
same text in separate homes. The poet, playwright or writer of fiction endeavors to stir a shared, 
honest response — revulsion, sympathy, anger — in her reading community, through the 
creative power of her imagination stimulating the imagination of theirs.   
Interpreting Silence.  This empathic solidarity does not always come easy for the reader, 
especially when the situation is far removed from his or her context.  Artistic works worth their 
                                                            
60 John F. Deane, “A Conversation with Rowan Williams” 
Simmons 
 
42 
salt lead readers to encounter an other, to experience an entirely different set of circumstances 
and sensibilities.  For a non-religious, modern reader to read Endo’s Silence challenges her to 
imagine how she might respond if she were a 17th-century Portuguese missionary priest working 
in Japan.  Faced with imprisonment and the chance to save his flock from torture, would she too 
cast off Christian belief?  A facile reading — one which does not take seriously the cosmic 
imaginary constellated around Rodrigues’s decision — might be, “I would apostatize 
too…because Christianity is false anyway.”  But an empathic reading requires self-displacement 
and a suspension of disbelief to assess the merits of Rodrigues’s decision as if she were him.  A 
more empathic reading could yield the same decision, but for different reasons than a hasty 
dismissal of Rodrigues’s Christian worldview: “I would apostatize too…precisely because the 
demands of Christianity are true.”  This reversal requires an interpretative consideration of the 
demands of Christianity in distressed circumstances; namely, what happens when public 
reverence of Christian images inhibits, rather than helps, responding as Christ would?  Probing 
deeper, we have a 17th-century missionary model framed in 20th-century sensibilities and 
sensitivities.  A modern, historically conscious reader may answer, “I would apostatize 
too…because the zealous missiology he espouses is insufficiently inculturated and needs to be 
adapted to better embody Christianity.”   
The various interpretations of Endo’s Silence make it, in Iser’s taxonomy, a “heavy 
reading,” because it invites a surplus of meanings and calls for a response from the reader.  What 
unspoken principles make up the thematic backdrop — the Ricoeurian “world of the text” — 
such that a young priest of his time would be so anguished over his choices?  What care does the 
text elicit, such that the reader takes Rodrigues’s questions as one’s own?  Great literature calls 
Simmons 
 
43 
for an emphatic connection with its characters, so that the reader can move about within the 
world of the text and “try on” another’s cosmic imaginary.   
Literary Anthropology and Neuroscience.  Iser calls this “trying on” literary 
anthropology, whereby a reader of a text — or an actor in a play — endeavor to fade out of her 
own reality in order to understand the reality of a character or role.  An actor cannot totally 
appropriate Hamlet (Iser’s example), since Hamlet is a character in a play, circumscribed by 
written text and limited stage directions.  But the actor employs his whole body, intellect, and 
emotions to enflesh the role, representing analogically the Hamlet that he himself is not.  In the 
attempt to embody this character analogically, what Hamlet might be emerges.  This same 
dynamic occurs when a reader seeks to understand a character in fiction: “To imagine what has 
been stimulated by the ‘as-if’ entails placing our faculties at the disposal of an unreality and 
bestowing on it a semblance of reality in proportion to a reduction of our own reality.”61  The 
engaged reader of fiction, then, brings a novel (or a play, or a poem) to life by subordinating his 
or her own judgment of reality, in favor of treating the fictive characters as if they were real.   
We find resonances here with a Christian anthropology, whereby the Word becomes 
incarnate to make fully real what humanity might be in the eyes of God.  Jesus’ embodied 
empathy models what constitutes – or should constitute – empathy for humanity.  Regularly in 
Scripture, Jesus is “moved with pity” or “moved by compassion,” depending on the translation.  
The Greek verb employed is visceral and earthy: splanchnizomai comes from the noun 
splanchnon, “guts, viscera.”  Hence Jesus’ empathy involves a concrete, physical response to 
circumstances in the world.  He sees a widowed woman weeping over her only son who has 
died, or sees a crowd that is hungry, and his guts turn within him on their behalf. 
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These would be quaint theological and etymological musings, if they did not also echo in 
our very physiology.  Research in recent years by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has 
discovered what he calls “mirror neurons.”62  Human “mirror neurons” perceive external states 
and experiences, and replicate them within the neurological mappings of the human body and 
mind.  So when we read of a character’s acute anguish and feel moved, it is because our neurons 
are actually, physically replicating that feeling within us; when we wince at seeing some else trip 
and fall, it is because our neurons instantly respond with an unconscious, pre-cognitive empathy.  
Damasio’s research gives neurobiological evidence supporting Iser’s theory that remote external 
stimuli – including what is revealed in texts – can, in fact, work on and in the one reading herself.  
It is in this sense that literary fiction reads us when it engages our imagination.  
Actus legentis and the actus credentis. Let us call this empathic act of the engaged 
reader, the actus legentis, by which we mean a willful act of suspension of disbelief and self-
displacement, undertaken to understand the intentions and actions of an other so as to 
assess the truthfulness of the other’s worldview.  The truthfulness conveyed by a piece of 
literature alien to one’s context and sensibilities cannot be assessed, apart from the world of the 
text the author creates.  I cannot, for example, assess the depth of Rodrigues’s anguish, apart 
from probing the scope of his worldview, however unthematized it may be.  To imagine how I 
would respond in similar circumstances yields nothing revelatory or truthful, if it does not also 
consider — and submit to — the cross-pressures the characters themselves face.  To refuse to 
engage a text at this level will yield not a fruitful interpretation, but an attitudinal judgment.  It is 
the difference between saying, “I feel Rodrigues’s anguish!” and “I can’t believe a priest would 
ever apostatize.  Catholics shouldn’t read this.”  The latter attitude might account for the uproar 
the book causes still in certain quarters. 
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There are, clearly, parallels to the act of religious belief, what we call actus credentis.  As 
a person approaches a prospective faith commitment from the outside, he naturally desires to 
assess the truthfulness of the belief system.  But like the appraisal of real estate, the truthfulness 
of an unfamiliar cosmic imaginary cannot be adequately assessed from the outside, without an 
attempt to grasp the interior world of belief.  To understand accurately the Christian imagination, 
for example, one would have to acknowledge his own (perhaps unthematized) beliefs about 
suffering, redemption, and humanity’s place in the cosmos.  Literary fiction, which treats these 
themes extensively, offers a non-threatening forum to do just that. Nicholas Boyle writes that 
“the great tragedies, by giving us pleasure in the immediate awareness of…the absolute shared 
quality of pain and Care, furnish us with a hint or foretaste of the one great Christian truth: God, 
the source of all existence, suffers too, and therefore we can trust that in and beyond the 
suffering there lies redemption.”63   In reading fiction or watching a play, one expects to be 
entertained.  The verb entertained is revelatory — as if held (tentus) between (inter) two worlds; 
suspended between one’s own interior imaginary and the external world of the text.  Graham 
Ward notes that “reading operates at a boundary between interiority and exteriority; it is the 
process of mediation itself in which we give to the text and we receive from it. Reading, as such, 
is a religious act.”64  We take Ward’s religious here to mean the binding (re-ligere) force of 
reading – we are tied to it, and it to us. 
This suspension — between the experienced truthfulness of one’s own life and the 
suggested truthfulness of an other’s — is not so much a fideistic leap of faith as it is a vulnerable 
step into the “Jamesian open space” Taylor speaks of in A Secular Age.  One is not commanded 
to leap, once and for all, across a chasm from known truth to possible falsehood.  The sustained 
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attention given to a novel, poem, or play allows the reader to “try on” the world of the text, to 
inhabit empathically the mind of the characters, to thematize what lies embedded in the world of 
the text.  She can understand the characters’ movements as long as she is willing to be enter-
tained.  She might recoil from taking an empathetic step toward understanding the character, but 
if she does not, she does not submit to be enter-tained by the text’s invitatory depth.  But to 
submit to be enter-tained is, in a way an act of attentive love.  A character, miserable though he 
might be, does not have to be a pleasant or laudable character to be instructive.  As Nicholas 
Boyle points out, the grittiness of such characters “only has to be loved enough to be worth 
representing, and worth the labor of understanding that goes into enjoying the representation.”65  
Milan Kundera speaks of novels as being populated by “experimental selves” whom we might, if 
we submit to such transformation, try on and even become. 
 The actus legentis is no more a “leap of faith” than the movement of one considering the 
act of believing.  One does not regularly hear of atheists spontaneously jumping into baptismal 
fonts, expecting immediate theological illumination and unwavering belief.  Rather the actus 
credentis is gradual; one tempted to consider the Christian faith might first step into a darkened 
church, imbibe the silence from a well-worn pew, and let his eyes and mind wander about.  Like 
the actor attempting to inhabit Hamlet, he brackets his sense of reality — for the time being at 
least — to entertain the Christian imaginary, played out in glinted mosaics and sooty statues; in 
stained glass stories and vertiginous architecture.  The muted awe of tourists visiting Gaudí’s 
Sagrada Família in Barcelona reveals imaginations engaged in wonder-ing reverence.  What sort 
of vision, what sense of transcendence, could create and sustain such a vision?  “To see divine 
immanence in the world is an act of faith, not a matter to be interpreted in other than its own 
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terms, if one grants the reasonableness of the perceiver.”66  He considers himself a reasonable 
perceiver; and with his imagination engaged, he wonders: what sort of cosmic imaginary would 
yield such imagery, such imagination, such a space?  How does his own spontaneous attraction 
to beauty, verticality, and symmetry resonate with the alterity of this Christian worldview?  Soon 
he attends a liturgy to see how this worldview plays out in finite time and concrete space; he 
does not (yet) believe, and he may never.  But his facile disbelief is fragilized; he senses that 
there is more to Christianity than the propositional truth claims and biblical fundamentalism he 
once believed (that word!) it to be.  Having actively engaged a Christian imagination in place of 
his own, he has doubts about his doubts.  
Cross-pressures for Christians. This dynamic, of course, cuts both ways in Charles 
Taylor’s fragilized world of cross pressures.  The Christian is enter-tained — is caught in the 
suspension of belief — whenever she engages with literature that problematizes the Christian 
vision of humanity.  Albert Camus’ The Plague forces the believer to accept a fragilized faith, 
vis-à-vis suffering: “the value of the religious imagination of [Camus’] work is that it demands 
that people of faith hold to their faith in full awareness of the challenge that secular reality and its 
attendant human suffering represent.”67  And Shūsaku Endo’s novel Silence, a story loved and 
hated for problematizing Christian witness, asks the believer how far he or she would go to 
follow Christ, even if it meant renouncing Christ?  The silence of God in the face of Christians 
suffering is movingly portrayed in the inner turmoil of Rodrigues.  As mentioned earlier, the non-
believer makes an actus legentis in ‘trying on’ the Christian imaginary to understand why a priest 
would be torn.   And the believing reader, too, engages in the actus legentis in placing herself in 
the proverbial shoes of Rodrigues.  This empathic move challenges the believer to consider, 
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honestly, the lengths she might go in following Christ, who himself was scorned and reviled by 
those in the world.  She must face the limits of her own belief by imagining at what point — 
under what hypothetical circumstances — she would also apostatize.  The goal of such 
imaginative exercises is not to abandon one’s belief, but to reveal the complexity of human 
resolve and perception of God’s will. 
Rowan Williams finds that art — poetry, literature, paintings — are successful not 
merely because they stir up aesthetic pleasure, but when they direct the imagination of the viewer 
to ontological depth:  
Success is when an artist, in Jacques Maritain’s terms, produces an object that 
has the solidity, the claritas, in the medieval sense, the radiance, the luminosity, 
the density, of real things. The poem, the music, the visual artwork has that 
density that says that the world is full…not empty; …Words or images or 
musical sounds that are charged in that way are an extraordinary testimony to 
the fact that we human speakers have been given the bizarre and utterly 
unpredictable gift of doing something a little bit like God—producing a reality 
that is charged, that is present, and that passes the radiance on to another level.68    
 
This task of producing a reality charged with radiance describes well the work of Marilynne 
Robinson, whose literature suggests grace present everywhere around us, even in situations 
where we might rather turn away.  In her quest to rehabilitate John Calvin’s theology, Robinson 
insists that the natural world is charged with God’s grandeur — that is, divine grace — and it is 
the duty of the empathic reader to pay attention to where that unthematized grace is embedded in 
the unremarkable daily rhythms of life.  To her life and work we now turn. 
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Chapter III: Marilynne Robinson and the Island of the Articulable 
 
The State of Modern Belief 
 
In his tour-de-force of western thought A Secular Age, Charles Taylor acknowledges the 
benefits of being a buffered self in an anthropocentric world.  Humanity can enjoy a sense of 
self-possession and inner peace, without the preoccupation of displeasing a moral order 
established by church institutions in the name of a deity.  Scientific progress and Enlightenment 
inquiry have ushered in incredible advancements for human health, knowledge, and social order.  
But this comes at a cost: it also might come “as a limit, even a prison, making us blind or 
insensitive to whatever lies beyond this ordered human world.”69   
This leads to the buffered self experiencing cross pressures – a desire to reject external 
authority from faith and institutions, while still longing for spiritual fulfillment and a sense of 
belonging and meaning. Historically cultural élites responded in different ways to these cross 
pressures.  One such path led to the rise of the heart-felt Christianity of the Pietist movement. 
Another path led to the Romantic axis, which sought to harmonize the interior battle of reason 
and desire, the chilly alienation experienced within communities, and the division of the 
individual from the great unity of nature outside of human artifice.  Schiller’s The Gods of 
Greece and Emily Dickinson’s Poem 1551 – which mourns the loss of religious belief as an ignis 
fatuus – speak to this sense of alienation from the divine.  
Thoreau found in Walden Pond the “perennial source of our life.”  But here too lies a 
paradox: “we have a kinship with this nature; it is the source of our life…But at the same time, 
this Nature can be ‘vast and dread and inhuman,’ other, hostile, indifferent.”70  Taylor sees in our 
“modern cosmic imaginary” a so-called “Nova Effect”: varied interpretations of humanity’s 
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place in a closed system of buffered selves.  For some, like Emerson, it has resulted in a spiritual 
kinship with the natural world.  For others, like Bede Griffiths and Gerard Manley Hopkins, love 
of nature was compatible with faith and (in Griffiths’ case) communion with non-Christians.  But 
by Taylor’s lights, the most salient feature of the modern cosmic imaginary is that:  
it has opened a space in which people can wander between and around all these 
options without having to land clearly and definitively in any one. In the wars 
between belief and unbelief, this can be seen as a kind of no-man’s-land; except 
that it has gotten wide enough to take on the character rather of a neutral zone, 
where one can escape the war altogether.71 
 
The focus of this chapter will be the place of contemporary writer Marilynne Robinson in this 
post-Romantic, post-nova effect world.  It will be argued that Robinson, while trenchant and 
polemical in her books of essays, takes a decidedly different tack in treating matters of faith in 
her fiction.   
 Marilynne Robinson is, for all intents and purposes, responding to the world she and we 
now inhabit.  Today, as we have said before, both believers and non-believers are subject to 
doubts about the certainty of their certainties.  One looks to one’s peers in western societies to 
see an overall homogeneity of activity and preferences, with the notable exception being the 
“multiplicity of faiths” that offer competing frames of meaning.72  This combination of 
uniformity and difference results in a fragilization of the individual, who is faced by the cross-
pressures of pluralism.  Taylor calls this “a spiritual super-nova, a kind of galloping pluralism on 
the spiritual plane.”73  The modern individual is faced with a dizzying array of options in the 
modern order – how to make sense of one’s sensory experiences?  This spiritual super-nova 
results not in the existential peace promised by a cool rationalism. Rather one feels the weight of 
isolation – a buffered self in a universe void of transcendent meaning or satisfying accounts –
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from traditional religious commitments.  This Taylor calls the malaise of immanence, fleshed out 
in a frenetic search for meaning and a “felt flatness” in everyday life.  Later we will refer to 
Christian Wiman as an example of someone whose “felt flatness” and absence of faith was 
remedied by Robinson’s fiction.     
 Subtler Language.  Taylor recognizes in Romanticism a counter-modernity desire to 
create a universe of beauty, a middle space between theism and unbelief.  This artistic realm is 
unencumbered by the moralizing weight of religion, but is aesthetically richer than a 
mechanistic, empty universe.  Romanticism can borrow Christian language (recall Chenu) and 
metaphysical framework to create an aesthetic penumbra of transcendence, without having to 
commit to religion’s moral or theological baggage.  Hence the modern Romantic can overcome 
the malaise of modernity by poiesis – a manmade afterglow of transcendence, which is 
reverenced not in churches but music halls; not on pilgrimages, but in cultural tourism.   
Taylor describes the Romantic poets and their successors’ task of articulating an original 
vision of the universe, apart from religious commitments.  This entails Shelley’s idea of “subtler 
language,” wherein this new vision is fleshed out to stir the pathos within the reader herself 
(recall again Lynch’s misapprehensions of the finite).  But we are left to wonder, “Why are we so 
moved? …[T]his mystery is now replaced within us.  It is the mystery of anthropological 
depth.”74  The buffered self that hungers still for mystery and depth in literature demands this 
subtler language, one without recourse to earlier shared objective reference points (sacred 
history, the Great Chain of Being, etc.).  This results in the challenge of the artist – the poet – to 
articulate meaning in a new key.  But in a secular age wherein the modern person feels a sense of 
loss of meaning, and fragilized (non-)belief, what role does literature have to offer?  Marilynne 
Robinson is forging a literary “itinerary” – to borrow Taylor’s term – in the field of Christian 
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literature.  We turn now to explore first her philosophical and theological commitments (as found 
in her essays), before trekking down the via litteraria she has paved for us.  
Marilynne Robinson 
 
Marilynne Robinson is, above all else, a writer curious of what it means to be fully 
human.  In her essay “The Strange History of Altruism” she addresses the importance of how we 
phrase our questions in the search for human self-understanding: “There is something uniquely 
human in the fact that we can pose questions to ourselves about ourselves, and questions that 
actually matter, that actually change reality.”75  What and how we ask about reality will 
determine the types of responses we can receive.  The challenge today comes from the rise of 
what she terms parascientific literature, defined as,  
a robust, and surprisingly conventional, genre of social or political theory or 
anthropology that makes its case by proceeding, using the science of its moment, 
from a genesis of human nature in primordial life to a set of general conclusions 
about what our nature is and must be, together with the ethical, political, 
economic, and/or philosophic implications to be drawn from these conclusions.76   
 
This positivist literature, Robinson maintains, confidently claims to answer essential questions 
about the nature of reality, “if only by dismissing them.”77  The epistemological onus for 
dismissing metaphysics, she argues, is not on the person defending ontological realism, but on 
the one maintaining a “closed ontology” – what Taylor would call a closed, immanent frame.78  
By Robinson’s reasoning, to claim that metaphysics cannot meaningfully speak of reality is itself 
a metaphysical claim.  Robinson shares Taylor’s rejection of the notion of secularism as 
subtraction (replacing God with science and reason): “If there is in fact an emptiness peculiar to 
our age it is not because of the ‘death of God’ and… it is not because an ebbing away of faith 
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before the advance of science has impoverished modern experience.”79  Rather, in Robinson’s 
estimation, if there is a modern malaise, it has something to do with “the exclusion of the felt life 
of the mind” from parascientific literature -- and the arts. 
Even theology, Robinson maintains, risks contributing to this exclusion.  “To the great 
degree that theology has accommodated the parascientific world view, it too has tended to forget 
the beauty and strangeness of the individual soul, that is, of the world as perceived in the course 
of a human life.”80  The surer bedrock for theology in a secular age then is not found in science, 
but in subjectivity, which is “the ancient haunt of piety and reverence and long, long thoughts.”  
The elusiveness of the mind, she reasons, is a consequence of its centrality.  Robinson maintains 
that “the absence of mind and subjectivity from parascientific literature is in some part a 
consequence of the fact that the literature arose and took its form in part as a polemic against 
religion.”81  If parascientific literature – we might note that she calls it literature – artificially 
delimits what it means to be human, then her project is to reintroduce the felt curiosity of the 
subject to the conversation.  She is echoing Lynch’s injunction: begin inquiry with the 
necessarily finite experience of the subject.  
Robinson writes in “Freedom of Thought” that these accounts given in modern academia 
“did not square at all with my sense of things,” because “the tendency of much of it was to posit 
or assume a human simplicity with a simple reality and to marginalize the sense of the sacred, 
the beautiful, everything in any way lofty.”82  And so Robinson’s corpus of books and essays is 
her response.  Indeed her novels, beginning with Housekeeping (1981), attempt to give voice to 
                                                            
79 Robinson, Absence of Mind, 35. 
80 Robinson, Absence of Mind, 35. 
81 Ibid., 35. 
82 Robinson, “Freedom of Thought” in When I Was a Child I Read Books, 5. 
Simmons 
 
54 
the interior world of its primary subjects.  We will treat this novel in-depth first, and later move 
to key elements in her second novel, Gilead. 
Nature and Imagination in Housekeeping 
The Buffered and the Porous Self.  Ralph Waldo Emerson was fascinated by humanity’s 
attempt to domesticate the disordered chaos found in nature.  Emerson wrote that for the 
American builder of destiny –the homo faber – “nature is thoroughly mediate. It is made to 
serve.  It receives the dominion of man…[who] is never weary of working it up... [He] reduces 
all things, until the world becomes at last only a realized will – the double of the man."83  The 
American Dream – the archetypal male heading to the west, taming nature, and shaping his own 
destiny – takes this as the given destiny of autonomous individuals.   
Nathaniel Hawthorne laments the intellect’s attempt to domesticate nature: “We who are 
born into the world's artificial system can never adequately know how little in our present state 
and circumstances is natural, and how much is merely the interpolation of the perverted mind 
and heart of man.”84  The re-telling of this narrative in culture yields further alienation from 
nature.  Hawthorne concludes, “Art has become a second and stronger nature, whose crafty 
tenderness has taught us to despise the bountiful and wholesome ministration of our true 
parent.”85  It is precisely this wounded relationship, of humanity to the natural order, that 
Robinson takes up in Housekeeping. 
Robinson, whose doctoral studies focused on Shakespeare, was nearly forty before she 
started writing her own fiction.  Her debut novel Housekeeping was never written to be 
published.  She wanted to see if she could write a story with images and metaphors that would 
hold her own interest.  Housekeeping reads like an impressionistic painting, offering the 
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narrator’s (Ruth’s) interior life as she moves from domesticity to the haunts of nature, memory, 
and the numinous.  The slim book begins with Ruth’s account of her small family: a sister 
(Lucille), grandparents (Edmund and Sylvia), mother (Helen) and aunts (Molly and Sylvie).  
Long before she was born her grandfather charged westward to build a homestead outside the 
fictive mountain town of Fingerbone, Idaho.86  Edmund worked long hours for the railroad and 
left childrearing and housekeeping to his housebound wife, Sylvia.  There is a large, black lake 
next to the mountain town that regularly rises at the moon’s pull, flooding cellars and filling 
backyards with the smell of earthy decay.  
The series of untimely deaths throughout Housekeeping reads like Greek tragedy.  One 
moonless evening, a “black and sleek and elegant” train sails off the bridge that passes over the 
town’s lake, sending all passengers – including grandpa Edmund – to their watery grave.  Local 
boys and men attempt immediately to find survivors, but they cannot determine how, or where, 
the train settled on the lake’s bed.  Soon the ice of winter seals the lake over.  There are two 
survivors, who were standing at the back of the caboose when the train derailed.  But, Robinson 
writes with a wink, “They were not really witnesses in any sense, for the equally sound reasons 
that the darkness was impenetrable to any eye and [because] they had been standing at the end of 
the train looking back.”87  We are given to understand that human perception of reality is not all 
that it seems.   
After abandoning Ruth and Lucille at Grandma Sylvia’s house, their free-spirited mother 
Helen drives a borrowed car off a cliff into the same dark lake.  She leaves no note of intention, 
and there is no trace of her sunken car.  (So much for understanding the vagaries of human will.) 
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In spite of all attempts to comprehend and domesticate nature, the mysterious world beyond us – 
and within us – remains inscrutable and indomesticable.   
A central theme of Housekeeping is nature’s decay and the new growth emerging from it.  
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt speaks of housekeeping as the “constant, unending 
fight against the processes of growth and decay through which nature forever invades human 
artifice, threatening the durability of the world and its fitness for human use.”88  But even this 
language of decay, Arendt maintains, reflects an anthropocentric artifice, where nature’s 
unpredictable forces are viewed as threats to imposed stability.  The act of housekeeping hopes 
to safeguard a home from the encroachment of nature and decay – insects and vermon, dirt and 
dust, flooding and feral animals. 
The house itself serves as a metaphor for the buffered personal identity, which – in a 
world governed by human artifice – requires constant curating.  For Robinson, housekeeping 
connotes self-preservation, keeping away the forces of nature by force of will.  When Ruth’s 
grandfather, mother, and grandmother die in succession, patriarchical and matriarchical duties 
fall away; but so does the protection such duties afforded.  
Eventually their earthy aunt Sylvie (reminiscent of sylvan) who detests living in the 
family home, becomes the sisters’ guardian. She serves dinner only after sunset, leaving the 
lights off to let the sounds of outside float in to occupy the house.  Ruth and Lucille’s lives are 
fragilized; the new routines of their house cannot provide stability; their clothes are dirty, they 
skip school, the house floods.  Ruth’s sister Lucille eventually fights this return to nature, 
insisting that the lights be turned on, and cleaning the house herself to restore order and 
cleanliness.  Like Sylvie, Ruth grows to resent domestication, preferring long days at the lake to 
staying indoors at school.  
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When Ruth and Lucille stay overnight once in the woods, Ruth embraces the moonless 
darkness of nature, but Lucille grows uncomfortable: “It was so dark that creatures came down to 
the water within a few feet of us.  We could not see what they were.  Lucille began to throw 
stones at them. ‘They’re supposed to be able to smell us,’ she grumbled…never accepting that 
our human boundaries were overrun.”89  Suddenly we hear Robinson’s phenomenological 
“subtler language” account for Ruth’s sense of union with the natural world:  
Lucille would tell this story differently.  She would say I fell asleep, but I did 
not. I simply let the darkness in the sky become coextensive with the darkness in 
my skull and bowels and bones.  Everything that falls upon the eye is apparition, 
a sheet dropped over the world’s true workings.  The nerves and the brain are 
tricked, and one is left with dreams that these specters loose their hands from 
ours and walk away… Darkness is the only solvent.90   
 
Ruth’s aunt Sylvie has led her from a buffered self, to one where her interior world and the outer 
natural world can merge in Emersonian transcendence.  In language redolent of Taylor’s porous 
self, Joan Kirkby reads in Ruth’s experience “a sense of wholeness without separation, a 
dissolution in which the ego’s grasp of the self loosens and the boundaries between the self and 
world dissolves.”91  Later Ruth notes again a “correspondence between the space within the 
circle of my skull and the space around me,” which leads her finally to hide in the wilderness and 
refuse to inhabit the house her grandfather built.  In a grand gesture of defiance, she and Sylvie 
attempt to burn down the house and flee.  But they find that this human artifice, too, has become 
just as damp and dank as the natural environment it was built to keep out.  Even a willful act of 
destruction – arson – is foiled by natural elements.  The house, like the self, is less buffered than 
we have been given to believe.   
Religious language in Housekeeping. If Housekeeping opens space for Christian belief, 
it is not religious belief that is easily domesticated.  Salvation-by-good-deedery distinguishes the 
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town’s churches, “and the obligation to perform these works rested squarely with the women, 
since salvation was universally considered to be much more becoming in women than in men.”92  
Hence when the churchy women of Fingerbone appeal to Ruth and Sylvie, Ruth balks at their 
“desire, a determination, to keep me, so to speak, safely within doors.”  Ruth’s wariness of 
churches notwithstanding, Robinson draws heavily on Biblical tales of woe: Adam and Eve, Cain 
and Abel, Noah and the ark, Rachel, Job, Absalom, and Jesus commanding the disciples to 
become fishers of men.  Robinson challenges the religious-minded reader to imagine, too, “all 
the nameless women”; Housekeeping’s nearly exclusive treatment of female characters goes 
along way to right the theological and literary imbalance. 
Ruth, like her Biblical forebear, is separated from her true home; she finds in Noah a 
kindred picaresque spirit.  She imagines Noah eagerly knocking down his house and using the 
planks to build an ark, with neighbors looking on in doubt.  “A house should have a compass and 
a keel,” Ruth concludes, and reasons that “looking out at the lake, one could believe that the 
flood had never ended.”93  If one’s world is going to flood, the “stable foundations” of this world 
offer small solace.  Robinson intimates that biblical figures, like the heroine and the modern 
quester, can be spiritual nomads on the seas of uncertainty.  
It seems appropriate that after the Bible, Marilynne Robinson’s favorite book is 
Melville’s Moby Dick, a tale of humanity’s fragile place on the sea.94  In Housekeeping, the 
surface of Fingerbone’s lake is the dividing line between the phenomenal world above, and the 
numinous world of memories and dreams of the dead (her mother, grandfather, et al.).  Ruth 
describes the world above as “hardly a human world, here in the fatuous light.” By comparison, 
                                                            
92 Robinson, Housekeeping, 183. 
93 Robinson, Housekeeping, 172. 
94 As detailed in Thomas Schaub and Marilynne Robinson. “An Interview with Marilynne Robinson,” in 
Contemporary Literature 35.2 (1994), 234. 
Simmons 
 
59 
below the lake’s opaque surface “is always the accumulated past, which vanishes but does not 
vanish, which perishes and remains.”95  The five senses, though important for observing the 
phenomenal world, are not the extent of our capacities for intuition.  Earlier, as Ruth and Sylvie 
float across the lake in a boat, they wonder where the train lies, with the memories of its buried 
dead.  Ruth waxes epistemological: “the wreck of my grandfather’s train is more vivid in my 
mind than it would have been if I had seen it, for the mind’s eye is not utterly baffled by 
darkness.”96  The limits of our sensory perception of the physical world are not, evidently, the 
limits of our capacity for sound intuitions.  There is epistemic ground, if not explicit argument, 
for attending to the data of consciousness.  But the ‘supernatural’ world beyond the sensible is 
not in some distant Heaven, but in the placid, impenetrably deep lake.  Robinson masterfully 
embeds the limits of our incomprehension even here in the natural world – our buffered 
immanent frame is not so tidy, after all. 
On one truant sojourn to the lake, Ruth and Lucille encounter “hoboes” under the train 
tracks. Ruth imagines that they in their tattered clothes, and the sisters in their own five-and-
dime outfits, are survivors from the train that had careened off the tracks.  Her imagination leads 
her to consider what the afterlife might look like:  
“perhaps we all awaited a resurrection.  Perhaps we expect a train to leap out of the water, 
caboose foremost, as if in a movie run backward, and then to continue across the bridge.  
The passengers would arrive, sounder than they darted, accustomed to the depths, serene 
about their restoration to the light… Say that this resurrection was general enough to 
include my grandmother and Helen, my mother…Say that my grandmother pecked our 
brows with her whiskey lips, and then all of them went down the road to our house, my 
grandfather youngish and high-pocketed…then Lucille and I could run off to the woods, 
leaving them to talk of old times…”97   
 
Ruth deploys her childlike imagination to consider what resurrection might look like.  She does 
not make explicitly Christian theological speculations; she does not invoke God as the agent of 
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restoration, or refer to Jesus’ capital-R Resurrection.  Instead she employs familiar illusions – 
e.g., a movie run backward – to imagine what resurrection looks like from the perspective of her 
finite experience.  She imagines her mother and whiskey-lipped grandmother, and her 
grandfather in his youth.  Hers is not an argument sub specie aeternitatis, but an imaginative 
rumination that seeks understanding of what lies beyond the readily comprehensible.  Her words, 
like sacraments, signal inklings of a not-wholly-graspable reality beyond. 
 Elsewhere Ruth finds an advertisement for Christian missions in China, where her aunt 
Molly had worked when she was alive.  I will make you fishers of men, it reads.  Ruth daydreams 
about what may be caught up in those fishing nets, loosely employing Christian images:  
“Such a net, such a harvesting, would put an end to all anomaly.  If it swept the 
whole floor of heaven, it must, finally, sweep the black floor of Fingerbone, too.  
From there, we must imagine, would arise a great army of paleolithic and neolithic 
frequenters of the lake…down to the earliest present…to the swimmers, the boaters 
and canoers, and in such a crowd my mother [who drove off a cliff into the lake] 
would hardly seem remarkable.”98   
 
At the end of time the fisherman’s net draws all of history’s forgotten dead into the boat.  What 
the net or boat are, Ruth does not make explicit.  Yet all things lost in this life — Ruth imagines 
— will be restored: “There would be a general reclaiming of fallen buttons and misplaced 
spectacles, of neighbors and kin, till time and error and accident were undone, and the world 
became comprehensible and whole.”99   The gathering of all things in the fisherman’s net reveals 
an order and intelligibility that remains opaque here in the physical realm.  And yet even the 
physical realm hints beyond; Ruth immediately jumps to images of “gulls fly[ing] like sparks up 
the face of the clouds,” “gnats sail[ing] out of the grass,” and a “discarded leaf gleaning at the 
top of the wind.”  From attention to these natural occurrences she concludes, “Ascension seemed 
at such times a natural law.  If one added to it a law of completion — that everything must finally 
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be made comprehensible,” then the fisherman drawing in nets might be a most suitable analogy 
for the sort of salvific work Christianity promises.  How else to account for so many unanswered 
questions to life, so many fragments of reality and adventitious thoughts?  Ruth ponders, “What 
are all these fragments for, if not to be knit up finally?”100  We find here Robinson’s 
characteristic blending of Christian imagery, inquiry into the natural world, and an analogical 
imagination that sniffs out resonances between the two.  Let us visit Robinson’s self-understood 
purpose of analogy in her literary work. 
Analogical Thought in Literature and the Limits of Language 
In a 1993 interview in Madison, Marilynne Robinson speaks of the language she used in 
Housekeeping as a means of exploring transcendent reality:   
I love nineteenth-century American literature. I was particularly impressed with 
use of metaphor in all the great ones -- Melville, Dickinson, Thoreau.  It seemed 
to me that the way they used metaphor was a highly legitimate strategy for real 
epistemological questions to be dealt with in fiction and poetry…[I]n some 
profound sense, reality is of a piece. It's sort of like finding a genetic strand that 
opens a whole genealogy. It seems to me that reality must somehow be 
describable as linked through analogue.101 
 
Metaphysical reality cannot neatly be contained by human cognition, but are intelligible only by 
analogia (to borrow from Aquinas).  The writers Robinson admires were able to “use language as 
a method of comprehension on the largest scale, at the same time using all the resources of the 
language and absolutely insisting that language is not an appropriate tool.”102  Language is an 
imperfect tool for the artisan, because it has its own logic that “drifts toward self-invited order,” 
yielding too-neat or too-small resolutions. 
Hence in Housekeeping, Robinson refrains from didactic exegesis of the impressionistic 
vignettes she paints.  The reader is left to grasp and intuit meaning, as she herself did in writing 
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the book: “If you put this [story element] in relation to that, what is implied? And the first thing I 
would think is, Not much, or nothing, and then – it was strange – in the sense that it was like 
there has to be, there has to be, I mean I could intuit something I felt was like a movement or a 
principle of unity, but I didn't know what it was.”103  One finds in Robinson’s fiction sentences 
that invite the reader to pause and ruminate; she offers numinous hints at the divine, without 
being explicit or ham-fisted with her descriptions:  
If I knew what [the final meaning] was, I didn't proceed. The whole interest of 
the book for me was in trying to be beyond my own grasp or outside my own 
expectations. I tried to set problems for myself that I truly experienced as real 
problems, and in a way what I was doing was testing my method, finding what I 
could make it yield. Of course if I had had any commitment beforehand to what 
it should have yielded, then I would have been ruining my experiment.104 
 
Like Ruth herself, Robinson is wary of the fatuous light of language, which domesticates what it 
cannot fully contain: “there really are thousands of different ways of thinking about things, and 
we can't demonstrate that contemporary methods, locally applied, are more interesting or more 
conducive to health or survival or anything than others. It's a phony scientism.”105   
The role of art, Robinson maintains, is to offer analogical thought for understanding 
reality: “I think analogy is the essential form of thinking.  I think that that is the basis of 
cognition and that art in a sense is occurring at the frontier of understanding because it integrates 
the problems of experience and the ordering of experience.”106  Robinson challenges science – or 
rather, a scientific materialism – that presumes a closed ontology, wherein we “say we know all 
we need to know in order to assess and define human nature and circumstance.”107  “Fact 
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explains nothing,” Ruth offers at the end of Housekeeping.  “It is fact that requires 
explanation.”108  Indeed Housekeeping is a study in the limits of memory and perception.  
On Nature and Beauty. Taylor maintains that when ontic commitments are suspect in our 
time, subtler language needs to be employed in discussing reality.  For many heirs of Taylor’s 
Romantic axis, even talk of purpose in nature is suspect.  Yet poiesis about nature – the Romantic 
ruminations of Mary Oliver, or the imaginative dreamscapes of Ruth in Housekeeping – offers 
persuasive hints at deeper meaning.  Taylor maintains that, 
The idea that nature has something to say to us hovers there in our culture, too 
far out for the buffered identity to be uncomfortable with it, but powerful 
enough to be evoked in a number of indirect ways—in art, in our feelings of 
renewal as we enter countryside or forest, in some of our responses of alarm at 
its destruction.109  
 
In essays and fiction alike, Robinson weaves concern for the environment with her larger 
concerns about humanity’s confused ontological place within it.  The degradation of the material 
world results from the lost conversation that has gone on “between humankind and the world 
since Genesis.”  Robinson is skeptical of any attempts in a closed immanent frame to rectify this 
relationship; rather “re-establishing a sense of the sacredness of what is occurring here is 
probably the only antidote, because without that there is no final urgency about the rescue of 
either one.”110  Without being too didactic, Housekeeping conveys a sense of sacredness in 
creation.111 
~ 
Taylor – like several others we have considered here – maintains that aesthetics 
ultimately drives us to consider the ethical as well: how are we to live in this world? What 
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promises greatest fulfillment?  Beauty is what will save and complete us.  This can be found 
outside us, in nature, or in the grandeur of the cosmos.  Art’s role is to make beauty visible (or 
audible, or otherwise intelligible).  This happens through creative poiesis, by employing 
language sacramentally, i.e., as signaling beauty and mysteries that lie beyond the words 
themselves.   
The Limits of Language. In her 2012 essay “Imagination and Community” Robinson 
argues that in failing to describe the mysterious, human language nevertheless succeeds: 
“demonstrations of the failures of language…are, paradoxically, demonstrations of the 
extraordinary power of language to evoke a reality beyond its grasp, to evoke a sense of what 
cannot be said.”112  Robinson’s own hope in fiction is to create space for the ineffable:  
I continually attempt to make inroads on the vast terrain of what cannot be 
said—or said by me, at least. …That is to say, the unnamed is overwhelmingly 
present and real for me.  And this is truer because the moment it stops being a 
standard for what I do say is the moment my language goes slack and my 
imagination disengages itself.113   
 
Like Ruth’s fascination with the opaque dark lake in Fingerbone, Robinson is drawn beyond the 
phenomenal world because of her desire to understand what lies beyond our grasp: “We live on a 
little island of the articulable, which we tend to mistake for reality itself. We can and do make 
small and tedious lives as we sail through the cosmos on our uncannily lovely little planet, and 
this is surely remarkable. But we do so much else besides. For example, we make 
language.”114  The language we use to account for the divine – be it subtle or explicit – is at once 
insufficient and all one has for the task.  T.S. Eliot’s “Burnt Norton” conveys that “words 
strain,/Crack and sometimes break, under the burden” of conveying a poetic vision that tests the 
limits of language.  And in theology, Rahner writes that “every theological statement is only truly 
                                                            
112 Robinson, “Imagination and Community” in When I Was a Child I Read Books, 19-20. 
113 Robinson, “Imagination and Community,” 20. 
114 Robinson, “Imagination and Community,” 21. 
Simmons 
 
65 
and authentically such at the point at which one willingly allows it to extend beyond his [or her] 
comprehension into the silent mystery of God.”115 
 Language’s fungibility and slipperiness can serve to show both the breadth and the limits 
of human poiesis.  Describing the multivalence of words such as “form,” Ashley Leighton 
laments that, “it is a licence for inexactness and an opportunity for double-think. These, however, 
are also the reasons for its appeal. Its scope for invention is large and free. Promiscuously 
adapted to a multitude of meanings, it moves easily between them, thus, by its very nature, 
signalling the 'moving' quality which makes literary language.”116  Words, like thoughts, move 
through us and do not have the permanence which we often ascribe to them.  But words, as 
Robinson notes, are all we have for the task. 
 A Jamesian Open Space. The former editor of Poetry, Christian Wiman, was raised 
Baptist but fell away from his shaky belief at an early age.  He came to a much different 
understanding of faith in his thirties, when his marriage and a rare blood cancer raised questions 
of meaning in life.  In his masterful book My Bright Abyss, Wiman speaks of the power of 
Robinson’s language in Housekeeping to diagnose the spiritual malaise he experienced prior to 
returning to belief: “This seemed to me, besides being prose of consummate clarity and beauty, 
to so perfectly articulate not only the sense of absence…permeating every spiritual aspect of my 
life, but also…to bestow upon it an energy and agency, a prayerful but indefinable promise.”117  
He identifies her language as biblical but “used in a secular context;” “spiritually suggestive” yet 
“contingent upon the natural world.”  Rather than didactically prescribing Christian belief, 
Housekeeping “cleared the metaphysical air, so to speak; it gave us – would-be believers, 
haunted unbelievers, determined secularists whose very passion for the book undermined their 
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iron exteriors – something to build on.”118  This world of language that Robinson creates is not 
the content of faith, but a “Jamesian open space” wherein metaphysical questions have space to 
ruminate.  Taylor explains that this space is not a set of beliefs which one entertains about the 
human condition, “rather it is the ‘sensed context’ in which we develop our beliefs.  Like the 
gentle winds on an open plain, in James’s open space, one “can actually feel some of the force of 
each opposing position. But so far apart are belief and unbelief, openness and closure here, that 
this feat is relatively rare.”119  Wiman’s account of Robinson’s power to address him in his 
buffered fragility is testament to the efficacy of subtler-language literature. 
We are each of us products of the background picture of our thinking, and open spaces 
give room to consider an alternate construal of the raw data of experience.  Recall Robinson’s 
capacious insight that “there really are thousands of different ways of thinking about 
things….”120 And indeed she has different methods for confronting the malaises of modernity.  
Her formidable essays explicitly challenge certain Taylorian “spins” that render the immanent 
frame closed.  Her second novel, Gilead, came twenty-four years after Housekeeping debuted.  
In it Robinson went beyond mere hints of transcendence.  It is to Gilead that we now turn our 
attention. 
The Sacramental Imagination in Gilead 
Gilead considers John Ames, an aging Congregationalist minister in 1956, who is writing 
his life story in a letter to his young, unnamed son.  Like Housekeeping, the story is elegantly 
written, marked by impressionistic understatement.  Ames’ tableaux of the daily life of a minister 
and father reveal the beauty embedded within creation.  The vignettes cycle through Ames’ 
childhood recollections of his father and grandfather; encounters of unexpected grace in the 
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sacraments; reflections on philosophy and religion from his days of study and writing sermons; 
and arguments with his highly educated brother Edward and agnostic antagonist, Jack Boughton.  
Like Housekeeping, the reader feels that she is taking in an impressionistic painting of words; 
one can turn to any given page to get a feeling for the whole.  
Gilead’s sometimes-joyful, often-melancholic vignettes read like the thoughts of another 
preacher, the curé of Ambricourt in George Bernanos’s The Diary of a Country Priest.  Robinson 
specifically mentions the book in Gilead: “I felt a lot of sympathy for the fellow, but Boughton 
said, ‘It was the drink…the Lord simply needed someone more suitable to fill that position.’”121 
Unlike Boughton, Ames is not fixated on explaining why God “gives” the priest stomach cancer; 
he is instead drawn to how the curé navigates the questions of faith, meaning, and what mark he 
will leave in his small corner of the world.  Ames is fascinated by this complex curé, whose diary 
reveals authentic doubts and periodic despair of even the believer (recall Fr. Rodrigues from 
Silence).  Ames recounts “reading that book all night by the radio till every station went off, and 
still reading when the daylight came.”122  We are given to understand that Ames, a fragilized 
believer like this priest, is fascinated by the doubts and despair of a fellow clergyman. Ames’s 
epistolary writing – about a life as a preacher, with its successes and failures, doubts and 
disappointments, impending death, etc. – reads as an American homage to Bernanos’s French 
country priest. 
Unlike Housekeeping, Gilead depicts the inner life of a Christian preacher, both explicitly 
and favorably.  But Robinson knows that she is writing to more than just her fellow believers.  
Hence Ames takes the multilayered phenomenal world as the starting point for considering the 
divine.  He offers a modest and cognitively indeterminate phenomenology of the sacraments: 
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“There is a reality in blessing, which I take baptism to be, primarily. It doesn’t enhance 
sacredness, but it acknowledges it, and there is a power in that. I have felt it pass through me, so 
to speak. The sensation is of really knowing a creature, I mean really feeling its mysterious life 
and your own mysterious life at the same time.”123  For Ames the power of blessing lies not in a 
supernatural bestowal of sacredness, which a non-believer might dismiss as vestiges of 
enchanted superstition.  Rather Ames rhetorically gestures to some mysterious reality, a res to 
which his “subtler language” can only point.  His – and our -- sacramental imaginations are fully 
engaged. 
Robinson uses Ames to advance the relationship of humanity to nature begun in 
Housekeeping.  The minister regularly describes the beauty of creation as pointing to God’s 
hidden purpose.  He shares a love of the elements of nature with Feuerbach, who recognized the 
symbolic power of water used for baptism. But Ames’s appreciation of nature is not of the 
immanent-transcendentalist sort: “[Feuerbach] is about as good on the joyful aspects of religion 
as anybody, and he loves the world.  Of course he thinks religion could stand out of the way and 
let joy exist pure and undisguised.  That is his one error, and it is significant.”124  What is this 
error of Feuerbach?  Ames seems to echo Robinson’s apprehensions about a closed ontology, 
which inhibits a capacious (and thus more accurate) appraisal of the depth and beauty of reality.  
Ames expands on this appraisal of nature vis-à-vis Feuerbach: 
There was a young couple strolling along half a block ahead of me. The sun had 
come up brilliantly after a heavy rain, and the trees were glistening and very 
wet. On some impulse, plain exuberance, I suppose, the fellow jumped up and 
caught hold of a branch, and a storm of luminous water came pouring down on 
the two of them, and they laughed and took off running…it is easy to believe in 
such moments that water was made primarily for blessing and only secondarily 
for growing vegetables and doing the wash.125 
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Much more than Housekeeping, Gilead offers didactic codas to these artistic impressions of 
Ames encountering beauty in the physical world.  A Christian minister like Ames recognizes in 
nature elements (e.g., water) that appear to be gifts given precisely to honor the divine.  With 
fellow itinerant Gerard Manley Hopkins, Robinson reminds us that God’s grandeur is not to be 
found primarily out in the cosmos, or in the mechanistic order of the universe; the world here is 
charged with God’s grandeur and grace.  After the vignette of water on the branch, Ames warns 
his son, “I wish I had paid more attention to it…This is an interesting planet.  It deserves all the 
attention you can give it.”  
But in Ames’s care, our gaze does not remain on this planet. Perhaps Robinson, twenty-
four years older than when she wrote Housekeeping, senses greater urgency in writing Gilead for 
connecting the dots between the natural world and the deeper realities it discloses.  After 
preaching at a service about the “gift of physical particularity and how blessing and sacrament 
are mediated through it,”126 Ames finished without letting his son partake of the bread and wine.  
His wife Lila takes their son up to the bread and wine after the service: “‘You ought to give him 
some of that.’ You’re too young, of course, but she was completely right.  Body of Christ, broken 
for you.  Blood of Christ, shed for you.  Your solemn and beautiful child face lifted up to receive 
these mysteries at my hands.”127  Ames moves from the beautiful image of a father feeding his 
son, to recalling the Christian belief that it points to: “They are the most wonderful mystery, 
body and blood.  It was an experience I might have missed.  Now I only fear I will not have time 
enough to fully enjoy the thought of it.”128  At some point in one’s life, questions of meaning are 
no longer merely academic exercises, but important considerations of one’s destiny, for believer 
and non-believer alike. 
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Robinson employs such vignettes – where even the religious leader is slow to see the 
sacred embedded in ordinary bread and wine – as a challenge to the dichotomy of transcendence 
versus immanence.  In her essay “Psalm 8” she writes, “I have spent my life watching not to see 
beyond the world,” she writes, but, “merely to see, great mystery, what is plainly before my eyes.  
I think the concept of transcendence is based on a misreading of creation.  With all due respect to 
heaven, the scene of miracle is here, among us.”129  Robinson makes a case that greater 
theological weight be given to the inklings of religious experience that one has in the concrete.  
Later in Gilead, Ames warns of two insidious notions of Christianity in the modern world. The 
first is that religion and religious experience are illusions (Feuerbach and Freud, et al.).  The 
other insidious notion, he writes, “is that religion itself is real, but your belief that you participate 
in it is an illusion.  I think the second of these is more insidious, because it is religious 
experience above all that authenticates religion for the purposes of the individual believer.”130  
Ames’s appeal to authenticity – trust your own experience and interior inklings – is an invitation 
to reconsider one’s stance towards belief in the Jamesian open space that Gilead opens up.  With 
her occasional excurses on philosophy and theology, though, Robinson is more explicit about 
calling out the “spin” one finds in the background of one’s “picture.” 
Literary Analogy in Theology.  As noted earlier, Robinson trusts in analogy as the best 
means of conveying theological insights in literature. She is careful to ground her metaphysics in 
terms familiar to the physical, sensory world.  Ames tries to account for eternal life in familiar 
images: 
I feel sometimes as if I were a child who opens its eyes on the world once and 
sees amazing things it will never know any names for and then has to close its 
eyes again. I know this is all mere apparition compared to what awaits us, but it 
is only lovelier for that. There is a human beauty in it. And I can’t believe that, 
when we have all been changed and put on incorruptibility, we will forget our 
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fantastic condition of mortality and impermanence, the great bright dream of 
procreating and perishing that meant the whole world to us.131 
 
In Robinson’s analogical conception of the afterlife, eternity retells the story of this world as the 
“epic of the universe”: “In eternity this world will be Troy, I believe, and all that has passed here 
will be the epic of the universe, the ballad they sing in the streets. Because I don’t imagine any 
reality putting this one in the shade entirely, and I think piety forbids me to try.”132  
Robinson argues that analogy is “the essential form of thinking” -- the basis of human 
cognition -- because it “integrates the problems of experience and the ordering of experience.”  
Here she employs analogy to show the power of art to expand and soften our closed ontological 
commitments -- to change how we conceive of our background “picture.” Aquinas’ analogia 
entis attempts to convey how all creatures exist vis-à-vis how God exists.  In like fashion, 
Marilynne Robinson offers a literary analogy for theologically imagining how our visible finite 
reality might relate to whatever lies beyond the visible world.  Our Taylorian “closed world 
system” – which many take to be a self-sufficient and closed to transcendence – may well be but 
an epic tale sung in the streets of eternity.  If that is the case, then physical reality (as we 
experience it here and now) becomes, analogically, the meaning-laden “literature” of the 
transcendent reality. 
Navigating Immanence and Transcendence and the Analogical Imagination 
 John Ames’ grandfather and father designate the extremes to be avoided in pursuing a 
Christian humanism.  Ames describes his grandfather, a preacher, as having a purely spiritual 
encounter with God, with no reference to grace at work in the created world.  Having lost an eye 
in the civil war, Ames’ grandfather viewed religious commitment in stark terms: “He lacked 
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patience for anything but the plainest interpretations of the starkest commandments.”133 But 
Ames makes clear that his half-blindness was not merely physical, but had theological 
consequences: “Normally speaking, it seems to me, a gaze, even a stare, is diffused a little when 
there are two eyes involved. He could make me feel as though he had poked me with a stick, just 
by looking at me.”134  His monocular approach left him keenly aware of the transcendent.  Afire 
with the old certainties of faith, Ames’ grandfather lived life “at a dead run,” without much time 
for savoring creation around him. “I believe that the old man did indeed have far too narrow an 
idea of what a vision might be. He may, so to speak, have been too dazzled by the great light of 
his experience to realize that an impressive sun shines on us all. Perhaps that is the one thing I 
wish to tell you.”135  We find echoes of Lynch’s description of the univocal imagination, which 
flattens lived differences. 
The other extreme is Ames’ preacher father, whose overly rational reading of his 
experiences wore down his transcendent faith commitment.  When Ames’ father takes young 
Ames to the bare gravesite of his grandfather in Kansas, young Ames marvels at the beauty 
around him: “I saw…a full moon rising just as the sun was going down. Each of them was 
standing on its edge, with the most wonderful light between them. It seemed as if you could 
touch it, as if there were palpable currents of light passing back and forth, or as if there were 
great taut skeins of light suspended between them.”136  Yet Ames’ father dispels any wisp of 
grace at work:  
“You know, everybody in Kansas saw the same thing we saw.” At the time 
(remember I was twelve) I took him to mean the entire state was a witness to our 
miracle.  I thought that whole state could vouch for the particular blessing my 
father had brought down by praying there at his father's grave, or the glory that 
my grandfather had somehow emanated out of his parched repose. Later I 
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realized my father would have meant that the sun and moon aligned themselves 
as they did with no special reference to the two of us.137   
 
Ames’ father is likewise half blind, but with the other eye closed to the layers of transcendent 
explanation.  Where a reductive scientism would give a non-purposive, physical account of the 
gravesite scene, Robinson is suggesting that a layered explanation need not compete with a 
scientific explanation.  Robinson’s sacramental imagination draws on material signs, such as a 
sun and moon equipoised on the horizon.  The young Ames imagined this “great taut skein of 
light” to be a sacred sign, pointing to a divine reality that was at once beyond the signs, and 
mysteriously, irreducibly borne by them.  Here, as elsewhere in Gilead, we see the Augustinian 
sacramental imagination at work.  
Robinson, through the eyes of Ames, engages Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s faculty of the 
imagination.  We recall that Coleridge conceives of the imagination as a creative power of the 
mind, rather than merely a collector and sorter of memories.  John Spencer Hill explains that “for 
Coleridge as for Wordsworth, perception is a bilateral rather than a unilateral activity; sense 
experience is a stimulus that evokes a response and involves (to borrow a phrase from 
Wordsworth) ‘a balance, an ennobling interchange of action from within and from without.’”138  
For Coleridge, the product of an act of perception is the commingling of perceiving subject and 
perceived object.  In other words, the net product of this perceiving act of imagination is not 
reducible to the subject (perceiver) nor his object (a perceived thing), but a union of the two.  
Iser’s insight of convergence of reader and text comes to mind, as well.  The imagination, for 
Coleridge, “functions as a fusing, synthesizing power – an esemplastic power whose operation 
generates a new reality by shaping parts into wholes, by reconciling opposites and drawing unity 
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from diversity.”139  Imagination, then, is not merely the unearthing and recombining of sense 
impressions in the memory. Rather, for Coleridge imagination is a “vital and organic power 
common to all men” which permits the mind to “penetrate beneath the transitory surface of the 
material world, that is, to see into the life of things and experience the intimate relationship 
between the perceiving mind and the objects of contemplation.”140  
A central dialectical tension of Gilead, then, is Ames’ attempt to navigate a path that 
avoids the poles of detached, univocal transcendence or flattened, equivocal immanence.  
Robinson employs Ames’ grandfather, father and Ames himself as three modes of considering 
how the reader might live out her faith in the modern cosmic imaginary, which tends to see 
reality as a closed ontology.  An opposing criticism is issued to people of faith, who would 
springboard from the concrete to the transcendental without taking seriously the embodied 
finitude(s) of creation.  Here, then, we find resonances with Lynch’s schema of engaging the 
finite to gain insight.  Ames challenges his son (and Robinson her readers) to probe the “false 
bottom” of this material world, considering how the physical universe’s operations resonate with 
the human subject’s intuitions of a deeper force – grace – at work.  With the power of a boy’s 
imagination, something as mundane as a sun setting and moon rising on the horizon challenges 
readers to consider the vibrancy – or deficiency – of their own imagination.  Dorothy Emmet 
argues that Coleridge’s Romantic epistemology asserts that "we should be able not only to look, 
but to love as we look.”141  If the Christian claim that God is love is true, then choosing to 
consider the concrete world with loving attention can transform any human inquiry – be it in 
philosophy, science, poetry, or literature – into a theological one.  
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Chapter IV: Questions and Conclusion 
 
Let us here anticipate a few questions and critiques, and offer some final thoughts – if not 
final answers – to our inquiry. 
Critiques and Questions 
 
Q1. Why must we distinguish between “light reading” and “heavy” or “great” literature?   
  
 We need not think of light reading as childish or low brow, and great literature as adult 
and high brow.  As we noted earlier, such distinctions are Iser’s; they are illustrative only insofar 
as they are not taken to be judgments on the quality of a text – or on the moral seriousness of the 
reader herself!  Light reading, like mindless television or satire, intends to provide pleasure and 
entertainment.  This is a valuable aspect of leisure, especially in societies like the United States 
that value long work weeks and taking work home.  Body, mind, and spirit need to rest to be 
restored, and light reading offers this. “Great literature,” ups the ante by adding a layer of 
engagement.  Not only are we interested in pleasure, but in answering a question: “if I engage 
fully, can this book shape how I think about my life?”  If the answer is yes (or even sorta maybe), 
then it is what we consider great.  Such literature engages the imagination not merely for 
pleasure, but for an interpretive response when we encounter such a text.   
 
Q2. What is gained by calling someone a “great religious writer,” as opposed to just a “great 
writer”?   
 
The Englishman Julian Barnes begins Nothing to Be Frightened of with the bittersweet 
observation, “I don’t believe in God, but I miss Him.”  Can someone who has drifted from — or 
formerly renounced — belief be considered a “religious writer?”  Religious-minded readers may 
object to lumping non-religious poetry or fiction in under the title religious literature.  Debates 
continue about whether the likes of Emily Dickinson, for example, qualify as a Christian poet. Or 
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whether “recovering Catholics” such as Don DeLillo, Cormac McCarthy, or Robert Stone are to 
be considered religious.   
Does treating religious themes explicitly make literature religious?  And conversely, does 
avoiding explicitly religious language render them non-religious? Our discussion has maintained 
that a sacramental imagination sniffs out grace embedded in the concrete details of the world of 
the text.  Hence for fiction to be classified “religious” it need not talk only of saints and relics, 
God or Scripture. But it does, as Lakeland notes, “have to open out into a world in which the 
claim of faith is admissible.”142   
Charles Taylor asks in A Secular Age, What is religion?  If the term is understood as the 
great historic faiths, or a thematized belief in supernatural beings, then “religion” seems to have 
declined in the modern imaginary.  “But if you include a wide range of spiritual and semi-
spiritual beliefs; or if you cast your net even wider and think of someone’s religion as the shape 
of their ultimate concern, then indeed, one can make a case that religion is as present as ever.”143  
Great literature, as we have discussed it, deals much with the ultimate concerns, thematized or 
not, of their authors.  Even the “immanent frame” that Taylor speaks of — wherein one 
understands the world as entirely natural without need of a supernatural penumbra, presumes 
(believes in?) a basic intelligibility of characters and plot, forces of good and evil, etc.  
McCarthy’s The Road reads like an extended Christian parable, where the absence of God and 
grace are felt acutely.  The eschatological imagery is, in form if not content, fed by the Catholic 
imagination of his upbringing.  To play against the haunts of faith is to acknowledge the staying 
power of a religious framework, even after it is found wanting.   
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And what of poets like Seamus Heaney, who considered Irish Catholicism a relic of the 
past?  Rowan Williams thinks highly of his writing, such that “the last thing I’d call Seamus 
Heaney…is an agnostic, in the sense of somebody who floats uncertainly around; he has a real 
commitment to the language and all that it means. Very often we tie down the notion of belief to 
mean having a quick answer to what you think is true out there, rather than, how do you inhabit 
the world you’re in, the speech you speak, and the vision you see.”144  Surely Heaney’s poetry 
dabbles and plays around with intelligible elements of a Catholic sacramental world, with food 
and kinship, the sacred and the ordinary, interwoven.  In “Clearances,” his mind wanders to 
memories of peeling potatoes with his mother, instead of crying or praying during her last rites: 
When all the others were away at Mass 
I was all hers as we peeled potatoes. 
They broke the silence, let fall one by one 
Like solder weeping off the soldering iron: 
Cold comforts set between us, things to share 
Gleaming in a bucket of clean water. 
And again let fall. Little pleasant splashes 
From each other’s work would bring us to our senses. 
So while the parish priest at her bedside 
Went hammer and tongs at the prayers for the dying 
And some were responding and some crying 
I remembered her head bent towards my head, 
Her breath in mine, our fluent dipping knives -  
Never closer the whole rest of our lives. 
 
A spontaneous memory of kinship with her supplants the traditional prayers of his childhood 
faith, and yet he weaves the two together imaginatively, even as he pulls away from the latter to 
embrace the former.  We are given to understand that a most natural, unremarkable routine – 
peeling potatoes with one’s mother – can bear the mark of love that transcends even death.  
Taylor notes that the distinction between the natural and supernatural arose not to protect 
a secular natural world from the supernatural, but to safeguard a terrain wherein God, not bound 
by the laws of nature, could remain sovereign.  What has developed since is the disenchanted 
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realm of “nature” sovereign from recourse to a fuzzy-edged realm of capricious deities and 
sprites.  Put differently, a religious epistemological distinction has been turned on itself, to 
foreclose a metaphysics that allows “God” to remain other.  Robinson remains “not terribly 
persuaded by the word supernatural: I don’t like the idea of the world as an encapsulated reality 
with intrusions made upon it selectively. The reality that we experience is part of the whole 
fabric of reality. To pretend that the universe is somewhere else doing something is really not 
true. We’re right in the middle of it. Utterly dependent on it, utterly defined by it.”145  Consistent 
with Rahner’s assessment of embedded grace, distinctions of “natural vs. supernatural” may have 
grown unhelpful.  If Rahner is correct, then searches for grace apart from engaging the finite may 
yield only staid abstractions.  Lynch warns that we not move too quickly from the many to the 
One, but let the engagement with the finite reveal insights on its own.  Like, for example, the 
devotion stirred by unbidden memories of a mother’s cooking.   
Hence attempts to delineate what constitutes “religious literature” may be the wrong 
question for our inquiry.  Robinson finds that great literature does not neatly fit into such 
binaries: “I don’t like categories like religious and not religious. As soon as religion draws a line 
around itself it becomes falsified. It seems to me that anything that is written compassionately 
and perceptively probably satisfies every definition of religious, whether a writer intends it to be 
religious or not.”146   This admits of Robinson’s grace-infused wordscapes as much as of 
O’Connor’s bleak short stories with outsize characters.  O’Connor prided herself on the gritty 
realism of her characters, many of whom she would call ‘grotesque.’  The religious writer can 
employ extreme images and characters, she reasoned, in order to draw the reader to see “a point 
                                                            
145 Sarah Fay, “Marilynne Robinson, The Art of Fiction No. 198” interview in Paris Review Issue 186. 
146 Ibid. 
Simmons 
 
79 
not visible to the naked eye, but believed in by [the writer] firmly, just as real to [the writer], 
really, as the one that everybody sees.”147   
So efforts to list writers as religious or not, Christian or not, is missing a more 
fundamental question: Does the convergence of subject and text admit interpretations of deeper 
meaning?  Will the person of faith find themes and descriptions that admit of layers of meaning, 
or does the text reveal a univocal, closed ontology?  Do its words probe and expose a “false 
bottom” to experience, giving way to analogical, imaginative depth depth?  A devotional book on 
the life of a saint may be beautiful and nourishing of one’s faith, without fully engaging the 
reader’s imagination.  But to draw a neat line around only devotional texts — to exclude 
something human from the bounds of inquiry because it does not use coded religious language 
— is to foreclose the possibility of enter-taining a reader.  To presume to have the last word on 
language of God is to have failed: si comprehendis, non est Deus. 
Here again, Iser’s distinction between light reading and great literature is instructive: does 
a text expect an attitudinal response to the text’s explicitly univocal meaning, or does it invite 
interpretive responses to analogical depth?  As the Christian imagination is interested in mining 
concrete reality to discover God’s grace at work, great literature by definition is open to religious 
interpretation.  
 
Q3. What are the limitations of the relationship between the actus legentis and actus credentis? 
  
Clearly, any analogy includes unity and difference, and the dissimilarities are as 
important as the similarities.  When one makes an empathic act of engaging a text as reader, she 
can enter the “world of the text” and be enter-tained by the text, as we have understood it.  But 
the act of faith is different from the temporary suspension between an individual and a literary 
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fiction and the characters therein.  We may sympathize with Madame Bovary or John Ames; but 
we do not entrust our lives to them.  We enjoy Hamlet, but we do not worship him.  An act of 
faith entails a total entrusting of self: the understanding, memory, will, and hope of salvation.  
Self-help books aside—which Iser would consider “informational prose” anyway – literature 
does not presume to offer a path to eternal happiness, or even a mundane “fullness.”  Whatever 
awaits us the Christian at the final reckoning will likely be different in kind and scale from the 
judgments a writer expects to face from her critics.  Lakeland notes that “in religion, we both 
believe in and believe the voice of the holy.  We may believe in fiction, in its power to address 
and challenge us, but we believe it only provisionally, since it is a fabrication (if not a lie).  
Religious faith, however, cannot be possessed provisionally.”148  In faith, we aspire to move from 
being enter-tained (“held between”) two disparate worlds – mine and God’s – in favor of being 
intra-tained, i.e., having our world held within the life of God. 
 
Q4. What about the dangers of the imagination?  What insures that it tracks with reality, and is 
not subject to delusion?  
 
Richard Kearney notes that imagination is what opens the possibility of sin, since it is 
what allowed Adam and Eve to divert from God’s original plan for them.  Indeed, the 
imagination can, in tandem with one’s free will, yield sinful outcomes.  But a few distinctions are 
helpful. To begin with, we might refer back to Coleridge’s helpful distinction between 
imagination and fancy; fancy is a re-ordering of concrete details from memory to formulate an 
unreality, whereas the imagination is geared towards seeing the present and future as yielding 
new insights.  Hence Adam and Eve engage in unreal fantasy, introduced by a cunning snake.  
They fancy that they can be like God, knowing all that is good and evil.  But this is precisely the 
problem of univocity: presuming that we know just as God knows; that we love just as God 
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loves.  Our knowing, loving, and creativity -- like our being itself -- is analogic to, and dependent 
upon, the kowing, loving, and creating of God.  George MacDonald is right that our creative 
imagination is made in the image of God’s creative imagination, and we align ourselves with 
God’s creative imagination insofar as we seek the good.  But seeking the good is not tantamount 
to knowing the good; this latter requires a discernment of spirits.  To the extent that our 
imagination increases faith, hope, and love, it can be said to be reliably of God; to the extent that 
it discourages us, narrows our vision, or causes us to hatred and despair, it is not engaging in 
God’s “dream” for the world.  The tradition of Ignatian discernment, based on the Spiritual 
Exercises of Ignatius Loyola, goes into considerable depth explaining the movements and 
countermovements of the good spirit.  It is no small thing that Ignatius refers to the evil spirit as 
“the Enemy of Human Nature,” who feeds the believer with all manner of lies that leave him or 
her doubtful, despairing, and stouthearted.  The evil spirit is, in a word, master of the fanciful, 
whereas the consolations of God employ and expand the human imagination to desire the will of 
God.    
If Jesus of Nazareth teaches us anything about how to encounter God, it is to approach 
God with childlike trust and wonder.  Jesus was not afraid to get away from the crowds to pray, 
so that he could be attentive to the will of God the Father.  Both the acts of faith and reading 
require sustained attention and, often enough, solitude, wherein one can encounter the other in 
truth.  Even the non-religious prize “mindfulness,” and in our technology-suffused age, both 
attention and mindfulness have proven elusive.  Lakeland writes, the “simplification of life is a 
necessary precondition for the cultivation [of mindfulness]…our culture is not mindful.  Faith 
should make us mindful.  Good literature encourages mindfulness.”149  Insofar as both reading 
and a life of faith aim at uncovering reality beyond mere words, they would do well to starve the 
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mind of distractions to let the imagination have room to breath.  Lakeland concludes that even 
“routine religion is anything but mindful, and most people these days don’t read the kind of 
books that promote mindfulness.”150  Tweets and think pieces can provide interesting 
information, but such prose does not necessarily stimulate the Christian imagination, let alone 
stir one to empathy for those who look and believe differently.  Christian love and hope are 
grounded in the empathic imagination – imagining reality in a new way, moving into the future, 
taking full account of the challenges and limitations of the present.  Without such love and hope, 
doctrinal religion is reduced to univocal propositions – grounds for division and flattened reality, 
rather than an encounter with the living God and the manifold differences of the human family.  
MacDonald also highlights that we do not engage the imagination in isolation, but have 
others who can verify and help discern between fancies and reliable thoughts.  A good teacher, he 
writes, “will point out to [his student] the essential difference between reverie and thought; 
between dreaming and imagining. He will teach him not to mistake fancy, either in himself or in 
others for imagination, and to beware of hunting after resemblances that carry with them no 
interpretation.” Just as any private revelations are weighed and verified in a community of faith, 
so too the imagination is trained and directed within the literary communities that we discussed 
in chapter two. 
 
Some Final Thoughts 
 
The sense that there is more to reality than meets the eye recurs across cultures, space, 
and time, from the beginning of recorded human history to the most current science-fiction in 
films.  Robinson argues that “extraordinary efforts have to be made to articulate feelings that are 
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very deep and also very general.  Those are the things that become the literatures of cultures.”151   
The homo faber that Arendt et al. speak of spends considerable time building artifices of culture 
to establish dominion over nature.  What if, instead, the work she performed was trying to re-
harmonize the human person with the reality of the cosmos (homo cosmologicus)?  And through 
this poiesis, she may come closer to understanding meaning embedded in a fuller picture of 
reality?  Wiman, the Christian poet and writer himself, reasons that “It is no blasphemy to say 
that every man creates the God creating him.  We are facets of a work whose finished form we 
cannot imagine, though our imaginations, aided by grace, are the means—or at least one 
means—of its completion.”152   
~ 
 
Artistic creation, Taylor asserts, was esteemed as the highest human activity during the 
Romantic period. To the outsider, Housekeeping seems to be an aesthetic paean to immanent 
transcendentalism, given the unflattering view of church folk and popular piety in the text.  But 
in the secularity3 that typifies our time, Taylor notes that “things are not so simple.  God is not 
excluded. Nothing has ruled out an understanding of beauty as reflecting God’s work in creating 
and redeeming the world.”153  Pre-modern art was taken up with mimesis – attempting to 
reproduce faithfully reality as it was observed or held in faith.  But the Romantic period 
introduced “subtler language,” which holds power to move the reader/hearer/viewer without 
presuming to make ontic claims on her.  The language of art creates a middle realm, “a free and 
neutral space, between religious commitment and materialism.”  And so secular Jewish aesthetes 
can stand to sing “Hallelujah!” for Handel’s Messiah performed at the Boston Symphony Hall. 
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And atheists can visit Chartres cathedral and appreciate without assenting to the metaphysical 
commitments of medieval French Catholicism.   
And Marilynne Robinson can write her fiction for theists and non-believers, lapsed 
Baptists and agnostic academics, ecologists and feminists alike, providing a numinous space 
wherein theism – even in immanent frames marked by closure – can become a viable option.  If 
the Christian God grants humanity the free will of assent, perhaps writers who claim to speak of 
familiarity with this God should replicate that cognitive “open space,” wherein mystery can be 
freely encountered, or freely rejected.  Marilynne Robinson’s literature holds out hope that once 
we encounter the enfeebled limits of our closed world, Mystery draws us out of ourselves and 
irresistibly unto itself: “Touch a limit of your understanding,” Robinson writes in an essay, “and 
it falls away, to reveal mystery upon mystery.  The one great lesson we can take from the study 
of any civilization is the appropriateness of reverence, and of awe.”154 
~ 
 
We have covered much ground here; we began with considering the importance of 
literature and storytelling in the Bible, using the incarnate Word as a model for employing words. 
In the Christian development of sacraments, we took from Augustine the language of signs 
(signa) that point beyond themselves to a reality (res).  We considered how these concrete signs 
precisely point to God in our discussion of nature and grace, especially as it has been developed 
in 20th century Catholic theologians who took seriously the personalist turn to the subject.  
Vatican II challenged the Church to sniff out signs of God’s grace abiding in all fully human 
enterprises; no wonder, then, that so many Catholic writers stepped forward to take the via 
litteraria in discussing nature and grace, sin and redemption, etc.   
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Where a Romantic aestheticism and a Christian imagination part ways is on their visions 
of reality.  Nietzsche argued that “only as an aesthetic phenomenon is the world and existence 
eternally justified.”155  Beauty is what saves us from the wretchedness of existence, and reality is 
tolerable to the extent that it can be rescued by aesthetics.  Nietzsche’s Apollo provides pleasant 
visible distractions from the meaningless suffering of Dionysian formlessness; Apollo is all we 
have to stave off existential dread.  To that extent, the aesthete is not interested in truth-telling, 
but in soul-soothing, an analgesic to blunt existential dread.  But in the Christian imagination, 
existence in the world begs the question, “why this instead of nothing?”  For the Christian, the 
answer to existential questions is not meaninglessness, but God, who for Rahner is that 
fundamental horizon upon which we entertain all our existential questions.  For the Christian 
imagination, God’s abiding presence within creation — God’s grace — recognizes all creation as 
laden with meaning.  For the Christian, Nietzsche’s principle is reversed.  Because God has 
created and entered the world in Christ, our aesthetic aspirations are directed towards that deeper 
reality which sustains creation, which the Christian calls God. 
 Hence literature, even secular literature, can be truth-telling.  A great play or novel, in 
creating a world of the text, represents characters who embody and reveal complex motives and 
actions of themselves and others.  The sustained appeal of such fiction reveals that embedded in 
each of us lies a desire to mine life for meaning and unearth truth.  The insights that characters 
(and readers) come to are mediated nowhere but through the concrete details and histories of the 
texts.  The entire field of literature reveals to us that small, concrete details of a story matter 
because they reveal the world of the text as they constitute it.   
 Ricoeur held that the goal of interpretation is to help make sense of our embodied 
existence.  Interpretation is not done in isolation, but, as we have argued, in concentric 
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communities of inspiration, reception, and critique.  Our interpretations are mediated and 
balanced by others’ in a community that receives a shared text; so too with a community of faith.  
The writer makes acts in faith — that she will be understood, that her attempt at depicting reality 
will resonate with others’, and that her work will be esteemed as veridical; i.e., reflective of 
truths common to human experience.   
And the reader, when he encounters characters and cosmic imaginaries wholly different 
from his own, steps into a Jamesian open space to feel the crosswinds of differing worldviews 
embedded in the text.  While light reading aims at mere entertainment and an attitude of 
satisfaction, great literature invites interpretations (possibly competing) of the characters and 
events in the text.  The attention required to step out from one’s own worldview to ‘try on’ 
another one.  To be “enter-tained” by a challenging text’s characters — lovable or not — requires 
an empathic self-displacement of the reader.  Interpreting this alternative cosmic imaginary 
allows for what Ricoeur calls appropriation — making the text one’s own — and broadening 
one’s understanding of reality.  No longer is Father Rodrigues an unintelligible alien character, 
but someone who is known through encounter in the text.  Great literature can broaden one’s 
self-consciousness to accommodate an other’s concern and perspective, all from the safety and 
quiet of a reading chair.  By analogy, when prospective believers engage in questions of God and 
ultimate meaning, they must suspend disbelief to inhabit the worldview of another.  To that end, 
we have argued that a sacramental imagination —taking seriously visible signs of invisible 
realities — harnesses words, images, and rituals that point beyond themselves to a res.  Great 
literature cultivates (a) sustained attention and (b) empathic self-displacement, skills that would 
go a long way to improving how people relate to one another and to God. 
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We take from Lonergan and Lynch that graces and insights are not wholly adventitious; 
they are mediated through reflection on concrete sense experiences.  Hence the small details of 
life as we experience it matter.  Rahner’s insight that the revelation of God’s abiding presence, 
which we take to be grace, is present to humanity always, if we can sustain our attention to 
recognize it in day-to-day life.  Writers such as Marilynne Robinson embody this Christian, 
sacramental imagination.  She employs “subtler language” that does not eliminate alternative 
interpretations of her fiction — indeed, her fanbase extends beyonds the comfortable confines of 
American Calvinists.  Robinson trusts her words and images to point beyond themselves to a 
depth of meaning; her very act of writing challenges the reader to pay attention to the Christ 
playing in ten thousand places. 
Ricoeur believed that the poetic imagination should lead to the ethical imagination; 
Western culture, he maintains, is not deficient in moral argument, but in a moral imagination.  
Insofar as great literature challenges its readers to self-displaced empathy for characters and 
situations, it opens readers to considering the joys and hopes, fears and anguishes of the other.  
This is consistent with Lonergan’s movement from reflection on experience to reflection on the 
Good — to a moral conversion, wherein one can understand the moral predicaments of someone 
different from oneself.   
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